



INTEGRATING THEORIES OF SECURITIZATION: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

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Abstract

Pakistan aligned itself with the United States in the Global War on Terror and actively opposed the Mujahedeen. As a result, the battle extended beyond the territory of Pakistan. This thesis focuses on securitization theory and aims to examine the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. To analyze the process, we must consider how the state of Pakistan has created existential concerns that have changed the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan from being an asset to being a strategic danger and liability. The Copenhagen school will aid in categorizing the discourses and speech actions of the bureaucratic apparatus and the political elite of Pakistan in order to persuade not only the residents of the nation but also the global population. However, the Paris school will view the practices and tools used as actions to enhance security or emergency measures to portray Afghan refugees as a security risk in Pakistan. These actions are carried out by different agents involved in security measures, especially after the school attack in Peshawar in 2014. The research concludes that the state is faced with a choice: either to accept the migrants and use them for its own benefit, or to portray them as a security risk and request their return to their home country. The study suggests that refugees are a group of people who are more susceptible to harm, and therefore,



the government should prioritize the humanitarian component when interacting with them.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Securitization, Copenhagen School, Paris School, Pakistan, Refugees.

Introduction

We currently reside in an era where frequent relocation is considered typical. It is a time characterized by conflicts and oppression, which compel large numbers of people to leave their homes each year. Forced migration persists for extended periods without any visible resolution in sight. Present day's the globe currently resides in a complex and mysterious "Era of Migration." (Ahmed, 2019). The World Migration Report states that there were a total of 281 million international migrants in 2020. Afghan refugees are a group that has been adversely affected by the prolonged duration of forced migration. Therefore, this article will specifically concentrate on the Afghan refugee community residing in Pakistan, the host nation. Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it has not officially supported or approved any specific guidelines or policies concerning the safety and protection of refugees. Additionally, it has not established any domestic laws to clearly define the legal status of those who are seeking shelter within its borders. (NADRA, 2019). The Foreigners Act of 1946 establishes the protocols for the handling of individuals of foreign nationality. The UNHCR is tasked with carrying out refugee status determination on behalf of the Pakistani government, as stipulated in the 1993 cooperation agreement between the two entities. In 1979, Pakistan openly extended a warm welcome to the migrants. Over time, Pakistan's policy of having an open border and providing help to Afghan refugees seeking relocation changed to having closed borders and being unsupportive (Zieck, 2008). Following the events of 9/11, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) after conducting a thorough evaluation. Prior to the emergence of non-state violent terrorist organizations in Pakistan, there was a purposeful change in strategy known as the "neo-existential security threats." These organizations established a strong presence in Pakistan because of the unstable nature of Afghan refugee policy in the country. These terrorists, due to their ability to spread and infiltrate, rapidly gained power and influence in the porous and unstable region of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. As a result, they utilized this area as a base for launching uprisings that crossed the border into both nations. (Government of Punjab, Pakistan, 2019)

As a result, instead of the relationship between migration and security, Pakistan has made Afghan refugees living in its country a potential source or pathway for terrorists to enter its territory (Ghufran, 2006). It considers Afghan refugees as potentially harmful to national security. In addition, the Pakistani government enforced the repatriation of the residing refugees following a terrorist assault on a school in Peshawar in 2014, resulting in the tragic deaths of several children and teachers. Following the incident, the Pakistani government implemented a Plan that resulted in the extensive securitization of Afghan refugees (Geo News, 2017).



As a result, the change from allowing unrestricted entry to facilitating quick return to one's own country resulted in the closure of campsites and educational institutions. Additionally, dates and time limitations were imposed to ensure that individuals left Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan (CGTN America, 2017; BBC News Urdu, 2017). The statements and claims made by the political leaders and the way the media portrays refugees have created a strong feeling of resentment and hostility among the people against Afghan refugees, who are seen as a foreign threat to the state and society in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan attributes this policy change to factors such as a sluggish economy, terrorism, drug trafficking, rising crime rates, and a decrease in donor help for refugees (HRCP, 2009).

Securitisation theory posits that specific governmental problems are designated as very critical security concerns. These situations should be treated with caution when they are identified as "precarious, intimidating, threatening, alarming" and similar terms by a "securitising actor" who has the authority to address the issue outside the realm of politics. (Wood, 1989) Security concerns should not be seen as external issues, but rather as challenges that need to be addressed by those involved in security. Characterizing migration as a peril to national security elevates it from a relatively insignificant political issue to a pressing concern that demands immediate attention, such as the protection of borders. This theory challenges traditional approaches to security in international relations and argues that issues are not inherently threatening. Instead, by labelling them as 'security' problems, they become security challenges. This research examines the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with a focus on addressing the research question: "How have Afghan refugees been securitized in Pakistan?" The study draws on the existing security studies literature to provide insights and analysis. Therefore, the answer will elucidate the "securitizing moves" undertaken by the state of Pakistan in relation to the refugees, through the utilization of rhetoric and policies. This paper will utilize the "Copenhagen School" and the "Paris School" of Securitization to examine the political language and practices involved in analysing the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. When employed in this context, securitising methods refer to actions that inherently suggest that Afghan refugees pose a security risk to the state of Pakistan. In order to evaluate the amount and methods by which migration is securitized, it is essential to examine the actions of security actors, including government agencies such as the military and political parties. This paper will also examine the securitization of refugees in Pakistan through the dual lenses of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools, offering a comprehensive analysis that bridges political rhetoric with everyday security practices.

The Copenhagen School: Speech Acts and Audience Acceptance

"Afghans have not contributed anything positive to society. Whenever something happens, it is attributed to Afghans, especially concerning the law-and-order situation. In one way or another, Afghans can be put in relation to the offenders, even if they only act as the transporters of the latter. The justification of their stay is no longer logical after 40 years."

The aforementioned statement reflects the growing disinterest among Afghans in Pakistan,



resulting in a hostile outlook that the migrants must navigate. This article will discuss the theoretical implications of the Copenhagen school's view of the securitization of Afghan refugees. This study will analyze the political discourses and speech actions of influential bureaucratic officials and political elites in order to elucidate the process of securitization of Afghan refugees. The aim is to address the research issue of how Afghan refugees have been subjected to securitization in Pakistan. Pakistan's portrayal of Afghan refugees as a security risk has had significant consequences, prompting these refugees to leave Pakistan and seek asylum in other countries or return to their war-ravaged homeland. The purpose of this article is to examine the security frameworks in the form of discussions and the strategies used by Pakistan during the 1990s, particularly following the incident of the school attack in 2014. (Baabar, 2016; ANI, 2016; Mukhtar, 2017).

Ever since the Afghan refugees moved to Pakistan, they have been securitized in the country from time to time due to various reasons. Hence this article will explain the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan within the realm of the Copenhagen School. To explain this securitization, the Copenhagen school will account for the intersubjective nature of the securitization process by drawing on speech acts and political discourses, presuming that the enunciation of security is a critical type of security act. The enunciation of 'security' involves the prerogative that a certain issue, object or subject is constructed to be a threat to a certain 'referent' which is so pragmatic that it is genuinely rational to transfer the matter outside the traditional politics so as to handle it by strict and urgent security means (Abbas, 2012). Hence, the matter of Afghan refugees has been securitized by the state and agencies of Pakistan during different time periods on the basis of different issues such as economy, security, social, political, and so on. These, along with other issues constructed against the refugees in Pakistan, will be discussed in detail along with the speech acts of several political and elite figures to convince the citizens of Pakistan regarding the problematic nature of the Afghan refugees and their involvement in different issues (Gul, 2016).

Afghan Refugees and the Economic Aspects:

The Pakistani government considers Afghan refugees to be an economic burden on society, primarily due to the high proportion of elderly individuals, women, and children among the refugee community (The News, 2016). Conversely, several refugees also secured employment and starting generating income. This contributed to the creation of money and income; nonetheless, it was insufficient and inadequate to improve the budget. The inexpensive Afghan workforce sparked rivalry with the indigenous population for resources such as land, water, food, employment, and property. The earnings declined as a result of the influx of migrants, since they were willing to labor for lower pay (ISPR, 2018). In addition to this, the Afghan refugees are also held responsible for Pakistan's insufficient infrastructure and financial difficulties resulting from the significant influx of Afghan refugees. The local community and refugees had to share a scarce amount of resources. The assistance offered by the UNHCR, or other organizations, has been inadequate to meet the financial needs of refugees. (Khan I. A., 2016).



At the provincial level, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan have been significantly affected by the influx of Afghan refugees due to their relatively underdeveloped status. Consequently, the inhabitants of these areas have asserted that the arrival of migrants has caused challenges for them. They said that while the government may have benefited from the commercial activities of these refugees, it exacerbated the economic struggle between citizens with lower incomes and Afghan migrants, hence worsening their issues. The surge of refugees has also been attributed as a contributing factor to the increasing inflation (The Express Tribune, 2018). . One significant economic consequence of the presence of Afghan refugees, as perceived by the local population, was the lack of tax collection from Afghan refugee traders. The local taxpayers had challenges as a result of this circumstance.

Furthermore, it had an impact on the generating of income Akhtar Mengal, the leader of BNP-M, expressed his concerns by stating that if we fail to offer employment opportunities to our own citizens, we would be unable to alleviate the burden of excess refugees (The Express Tribune, 2019).

However, there is an alternative perspective that presents the aforementioned repercussions as artificial creations rather than actual truths. Research indicates that migrants often have a positive impact on the economy of a state, rather than a negative one. Afghan refugees have made significant contributions to Pakistan's labor market, infrastructure, transportation, carpet weaving, and several other economic sectors. While the utilization of inexpensive immigrant labor may have resulted in the displacement of local workers, it also contributed to the expansion of many industrial sectors, ultimately fueling economic growth. In addition to this, a local Urdu daily in Pakistan has confirmed that Afghan immigrants have contributed 325 million dollars to the Pakistani economy. The majority of this was attributed to the remittances supplied to Afghan families living in Pakistan by their relatives working overseas. (Khan A., 2017).

Afghan Refugees and the Social Problems of Pakistan:

The media, government authorities, and residents of Pakistan have consistently condemned and held Afghan refugees responsible for the spread of societal problems from Afghanistan to Pakistan from their initial migration to the country. They have faced allegations of promoting criminality, trafficking drugs, and arming Pakistani society. In addition to these issues, they have also faced criticism for disrupting the demographic, ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian equilibrium in the parts of Pakistan where they have chosen to reside.

Initially, Afghan immigrants were seen as a catalyst for drug trafficking in Pakistan. The research addressing drug trafficking in Latin America and Southeast Asia reveals that places experiencing political instability or armed conflicts are particularly susceptible to social vices, such as drug trafficking (Siddiqui, 2019). Therefore, this occurred in Afghanistan. The warlords in Afghanistan engaged in these malevolent activities, resulting in Afghanistan becoming a hub for illicit narcotics. Drug trafficking also financed the costs of resisting the Soviet invasion (Siddiqui, 2019).



The Pashtuns, originating from Afghanistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area of Pakistan, initiated the cultivation of poppy plants and were responsible for the production of about 70 percent of the world's superior-grade heroin (Grare & Maley, 2011). Consequently, they emerged as the largest providers globally. The drug issue that arose as a result of the deliberate use of narcotics to support anti-Soviet activities in Afghanistan was attributed to Afghan refugees by the residents and authorities of Pakistan. Contrary to expectations, evidence indicates that Pakistan played a significant role as a participant in the extensive opium production supply chain throughout the 1980s, particularly during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (The Express Tribune, 2012). The production of opium resulted in the substitution of the previously dominant trio of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand with Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan as the new prominent region for opium production, known as the golden crescent. This shift was significant enough that even some government officials were implicated in the illicit drug trade (Geo News, 2017).

Subsequently, drug trafficking expanded beyond the borders of Pakistan and thrived in prominent urban centers, such as Karachi. The Afghan Basti, situated in Sohrab Goth, Karachi, was once recognized as the largest drug distribution hub in Asia. The operations of mafias and drug traffickers extended beyond the trade of narcotics to encompass actions such as abduction, terrorism, arms trafficking, people smuggling, and several other unlawful endeavors (Khan J. A., 2016). The act of engaging in drug trafficking has significantly damaged Pakistan's reputation within the global world. In 1992, a rigorous and thorough campaign was launched to eradicate narcotics from Pakistan, and the efforts were successful (Punjab Police, Pakistan, 2015).

Pakistan has criticized Afghan migrants for the introduction of societal vices, such as the proliferation of weapons and criminal activities, within its borders. Afghan refugees have been implicated in many unlawful and clandestine activities. Nevertheless, statistical data indicates that only a small proportion of Afghan migrants have been implicated in criminal behavior. The police and bureaucratic authorities of Pakistan implemented a process of securitization on the Afghan refugees. From 2014 to 2016, statistics from the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa revealed that out of a total of 23,007 persons engaged in organized crimes, only 300 were identified as Afghan refugees. This accounts for a tiny 1.3% of the total number of individuals engaging in criminal activities. The Afghan exodus have been attributed to the outbreak of sectarian violence in Pakistan. These conflicts arose when Sunni Afghan refugees settled in areas mostly inhabited by Shia communities, or vice versa. In 1987, Afghan refugees were said to have participated in a conflict in Kurram agency, Pakistan, resulting in the death of over 200 individuals. In 2007, comparable occurrences happened. Conversely, the migration of Shia Hazara Afghans into areas of Pakistan that are mostly Sunni has resulted in frequent conflicts (Alimia, 2017). Pakistan has consisted of both Sunni and Shia faiths since its independence, however no sectarian conflicts have occurred. The influx of Afghan migrants into Pakistan introduced external actors who acted as proxies to disrupt the internal peace and harmony of the nation. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place concurrently in the year 1979. These occurrences extended into Pakistan, fostering and promoting factions that were supportive and fueling sectarian



militancy (Alimia, *Afghans in Pakistan face a perilous future*, 2012). The increase in sectarian divisions within Pakistani society can be attributed to the use of religion by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88). The legitimization and consolidation of his power, as well as the national security purpose of establishing strong connections with the Afghan Mujahideen after 1979, were the causes of the conflicts (Hashim, 2017).

During the 1980s, Pakistan became a battleground where Iran, with a majority Shia population, and Saudi Arabia, which is predominantly Sunni, engaged in proxy warfare. Both regimes pushed their influence on the sects by providing financial support to Madrasahs, which were organized along sectarian lines, in order to engage in warfare against the Soviets (Javed, 2015).

The Construction of Afghan Refugees as the Security Threats in Pakistan

The depiction of Afghan refugees as a significant security concern for Pakistan is a multifaceted matter. The refugees are being accused of engaging in militancy and terrorism, with a significant number of them claiming to be directly involved in or aiding such actions. Nevertheless, official figures indicate that these charges are frequently exaggerated. The majority of militants and terrorists in Pakistan are indigenous individuals who have been engaging in warfare owing to their ideological disagreements with the government and authorities. There is also worry about the states' involvement in encouraging and supporting proxies that become uncontrollable. The NISP report (2014-2018) emphasizes the government's efforts to enhance security measures for the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan following the events of 9/11 (Siddiqui, 2019).

There have been allegations that Afghan refugees are involved in working with the Indian Intelligence Agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The apparent connection between the Indian and Afghan intelligence is seen as a security risk, since the security establishment thinks that India's presence in Afghanistan is aimed at promoting instability by providing financial assistance to militant organizations for carrying out terrorist acts. The growing relationship between India and Afghanistan is clearly seen in the indirect involvement of local participants in addressing global threats, such as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This has influenced how the Pakistani security apparatus perceives the security situation of Afghan refugees (Rehman & Shahzad, 2009).

Pakistan's enforcement authorities have associated the refugee camps housing Afghan refugees in Pakistan with security risks. As a result of the uncontrolled movement of Afghan migrants, these camps were considered safe havens for extremist groups and terrorist organizations. Investigations have revealed that Afghan refugees had been implicated in terrorist acts or provided shelter to militants within their homes. In 2017, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) apprehended an individual believed to be involved in terrorism in Peshawar (Siddiqui, 2019). Similarly, in 2015, the Capital Development Authority compelled more than fifty thousand refugees to evacuate a neighborhood that was identified as a center for illegal activity.



Studies have demonstrated that several refugee camps have transformed into fertile environments for the cultivation and recruitment of terrorists and militants. Uneducated and jobless Afghan migrants have been recruited as mercenaries by foreign intelligence agencies, manipulating them to carry out suicide attacks in public areas or important locations (Borthakur, 2017). During the year 2008, a total of 60 incidents of suicide bombing occurred, resulting in the loss of 889 lives and causing injuries to 2,072 individuals. The existence of undocumented or illegal refugees in Pakistan affords them the chance to exploit the legal loophole. (Chaudhry, 2017).

Afghan immigrants frequently pursued their education at madrassahs, which offered a more affordable alternative to public or private schools in Pakistan due to their limited financial means. A significant number of these institutions obtained financial support from outside and had connections with terrorist groups. The Taliban extended its operations in tribal regions, assassinating tribal leaders and developing networks for communication, factories for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and centers for training suicide bombers (Dawn, 2015).

The Paris School: Everyday Practices and Bureaucratic Procedures

The Paris school of securitization focuses on the tools and procedures used in the securitization process. Unlike the Copenhagen school, it does not provide an explanation of the policies and methods employed by the securitizing agent.

This section will analyze the policies of the governmental agencies and the establishment of Pakistan to understand the ramifications of the securitization process by examining these instruments and practices. Firstly, we will provide a concise overview of the security governance of Pakistan. Bazlacq and Bigo emphasize the practices of securitization, such as the registration of Afghan refugees and harassment, in their works. This article will focus on the security protocols implemented by the law enforcement agencies and military of Pakistan, both inside and outside (Muhammad, 2017).

In addition to examining methods, this examination will also include an evaluation of the securitization instruments utilized in the implementation of these strategies. These tools will help in comprehending how they define a specific danger and how the composition of a given threat informs the process of securitization. The utilization of these securitizing methods and instruments has forced a significant number of Afghan refugees to depart from Pakistan. The article will examine various techniques and tools employed since the 1990s, including the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the closing of camps. The issue of fencing the Durand line has been under consideration since the September 11 attacks, but Pakistan was unable to proceed due to the Afghan government's opposition. Nevertheless, the recurring acts of terrorism, like the attack on the army academy, forced Pakistan to implement measures concerning the fortification of the Pak-Afghan border (Borthakur, 2017).

Likewise, the persecution of Afghan refugees started following the events of 9/11, during which



the Afghan refugees who were residing in the host country without proper legal documentation faced significant hardships. The process gained momentum following the assault on an army school, resulting in the tragic loss of several school children and instructors. Similarly, the National Action Policy was implemented following the 2014 army school incident (Business Recorder, 2016).

Securitized Governance and Policies of Pakistan Concerning Afghan Refugees

The period spanning from 1979 to 1991 might be referred to as "the era of hospitality." Pakistan graciously received the Afghan refugees after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol did not grant them the official designation as refugees, and Pakistan did not establish any specific legal structure for them. Afghan refugees were treated in accordance with the preexisting norms outlined in the constitution of Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan granted UNHCR the authority to ascertain the refugee status of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan (Rehman & Shahzad, 2009). The absence of a comprehensive policy framework in Pakistan poses challenges in effectively addressing the prolonged refugee problem. Subsequently, once the objective of expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan was achieved, Pakistan promptly experienced "refugee fatigue" and insisted on the return of Afghan refugees. In addition to this, the western world also experienced "donor fatigue" concurrently and left the area in a state of chaos. Various groups of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan initiated conflicts to gain control over the government, resulting in a civil war in Afghanistan. The ongoing influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan intensified the securitization of the refugee population. The government attributed a variety of social maladies in Pakistani society to the immigrants (Barker, 2018).

As a result, Pakistan imposed limitations on the mobility of Afghans and dismantled many campsites in order to promote their return to Afghanistan. US officials who visited Islamabad prior to the 9/11 tragedy summarized the Pakistani stance on Afghans by stating, "if donors experience donor fatigue, then Pakistanis experience asylum fatigue." Both donors and Pakistanis have lost their tolerance with the Afghan scenario (Dawn, 2019). In response to the 9/11 tragedy and the school assault in 2014, Pakistan implemented a restrictive policy regarding the influx of Afghan refugees into the country. The reason for this was a significant securitization effort, which relied on the rationale of economic difficulties. Consequently, Pakistan implemented more stringent governance measures. The regionalization of the WOT can be observed in the area, as Afghans who had similar religious, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds as Pakistan were perceived as a securitized group. In addition, Pakistan granted exemptions to Afghan refugees from the terms of the Citizenship Act, the 1946 Foreigners' Act, and the 1951 Foreigners'. These measures would have conferred Pakistani citizenship upon Afghans, categorizing them as individuals with "invalid visas and permits." As the refugees did not acquire citizenship, they were subjected to either imprisonment or expulsion. (Dawn, 2018).

Therefore, Afghan refugees were utilized as a means to accomplish political objectives in the past.



The employment conditions of Afghans in Pakistan are being subjected to a migration management system that prioritizes the security of their labor market opportunities.

Similarly, the process of securing Afghans' access to work prospects subjected them to bias, redundancy, and marginalization. The rejection of the host state increased their ability to serve as conduits for continuous settlement and residence. (Government of Pakistan, 2017)

Registration Process of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

The registration of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was place for the first time in 2005, coinciding with the conduction of a census. In 2006-07, a thorough registration was conducted following the census. The method was conducted to ascertain the population of Afghan refugees staying in Pakistan since 1979. The procedure was also postponed by three months beyond the designated deadline in order to allow sufficient time for refugees who had relocated to Pakistan subsequent to the events of 9/11. Registration data revealed that the number of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan at that time exceeded three million (Khattak, 2015). The Pakistani government said that only individuals who participated in the census would be eligible to petition for residence in Pakistan. In addition, they were issued Proof of Registration (PoR) cards that officially identified them as "Afghan citizens temporarily residing in Pakistan." (SIGAR, 2015).

A significant number of Afghan refugees refrained from registering for the procedure, perhaps due to apprehension of potential deportation. Several individuals failed to register due to their lack of understanding of the importance of the procedure. Additionally, a considerable number of refugees were unable to register since they were unable to physically attend the process. (PITB, 2019) The refugees who received the PoR cards were considered "prima facie" by the UNHCR. The Afghan refugees who came after to the 2005 census were unable to register, thereby categorizing them as undocumented refugees by default.

The refugees who exhibited aggressive attitudes and impulsive behavior were individuals who lacked proper documentation and were in the country illegally. These individuals belonged to non-state terrorist organizations that frequently crossed the porous border into Pakistan, causing difficulty for the whole refugee community and tarnishing their reputation among Pakistanis. Moreover, not all Afghan refugees in Pakistan were considered refugees from a valid perspective, since they often migrated back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They were classified as economic migrants. Therefore, the law-abiding migrants were forced to endure the burden caused by the unlawful ones. (Geo News, 2017)

The National Action Plan

The Army Public School in Peshawar was targeted by terrorists on 16 December 2014. The assault led to the deaths of several school students and staff. The incident caused significant concern among the establishment, governmental, and enforcement organizations, leading to the commencement of a large-scale campaign to target the terrorist hideouts in Pakistan. (Afzal, 2019).



After the incident, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Shareef, organized an All-Party Conference to explore the methods of combating the terrorists without discrimination. The Prime Minister characterized the situation as highly serious and insisted on a specific and effective plan of action. Following debates and deliberations, Nawaz Sharif delivered a speech to the people of Pakistan, outlining a twenty-point agenda as a proposed plan of action for the future. The establishment of Military Courts was the essential aspect. In addition, the Government of Pakistan created the "National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)" to effectively coordinate and oversee various security agencies in order to identify and eliminate terrorism within the country. With the support of NACTA, a comprehensive national security policy was formulated to address and manage various security issues on a national scale. The term used to refer to this was "the National Action Plan." The Plan identified 263 Afghan refugees in point 19 as a potential security problem in Pakistan. Point 19 establishes the narrative of perceiving the presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan as a security danger. It emphasizes the need to develop a comprehensive policy to address the issue, starting with the registration of all refugees. SAFRON Federal Secretary Jamali informed Human Rights Watch that the federal government had to intercede in order to persuade the provincial administration of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to exercise self-control and avoid widespread expulsions of Afghans following the Peshawar school assault on December 16, 2014. He stated that the provincial authorities of K-P intended to expel the Afghan refugees soon after the December 16 incident. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) administration has adopted a confrontational stance against Afghan refugees, and there are also accusations of instances of intimidation and mistreatment occurring in Peshawar and other regions of K-P. We have addressed the issue of harassment with the K-P administration, but, they are not exercising sufficient supervision over the police over the topic of harassment of Afghans. The threats had a significant and profound influence. In January 2015, the number of registered Afghans returning from Pakistan to Afghanistan was nine times more than the number in December 2014, as reported by UNHCR. Due to the customary decrease in repatriation around mid-winter, individuals who felt compelled to return encountered extra difficulties. The majority of returnees originated from three Pakistani provinces, namely Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Azad Kashmir, and Punjab. These areas witnessed a rise in the number of arrests, detentions, and evictions of Afghan individuals over the same time frame (Roehrs, 2015).

Harassment of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

"The police did not used to beat us much before December 16, 2014 [when the Taliban attacked a Pakistani school]. Now they [beat] us for no reason. I am afraid that one day when I won't have bribe money, they will kill me. None of my other family members except me and my brother leave the house now. Our children do not go to school; they do not even go to play outside anymore.... [But] I cannot go back to Afghanistan."

(Karim (a pseudonym), an Afghan shopkeeper living in Peshawar, July 2015)

The preceding comment is attributed to an Afghan merchant who experienced harassment and mistreatment by the enforcement agency of Pakistan. The declaration indicates that the



infringement of human rights against Afghan refugees in Pakistan escalated subsequent to the army school incident in 2014. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has conducted an assessment of the anti-refugee actions and crackdowns against Afghan refugees following the implementation of the "Voluntary Repatriation program." Since the events of 9/11, a total of 269 Afghan refugees in Pakistan have experienced harassment, physical assault, and bribery at the hands of the police and enforcement agencies as part of a strategy to increase security measures. These evaluations have been extensively discussed at both national and international human rights conventions. The US Department of State has evaluated the discrimination and intimidation experienced by Afghan refugees, including police extortion and harassment in the form of expulsion and deportation threats owing to their unlawful settlement. (Khan, 2017). The regular incarceration, harassment, persecution, and arbitrary arrests of Afghans have become commonplace and customary. Multiple incidences were documented concerning the apprehension of refugees. Afghan refugees have been subjected to attacks, raids, and intrusions. In 2016, a total of 7,872 Afghans were apprehended in Peshawar and 4,139 legal proceedings were filed against them for unlawfully residing in the area. In 2015, a total of 1133 Afghan refugees who had entered Punjab illegally were apprehended in a well-coordinated operation, which was in violation of the Foreigner's Act. (Borthakur, 2017)

Fencing the Pak-Afghan Border

Exercising authority over borders to reduce the number of refugees entering a country is a significant aspect of enhancing security, asserting sovereignty, and governing effectively. The Durand line is a 2600 km boundary that is jointly shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan and has around 262 sites of crossing. (Grare & Maley, 2011). This border is challenging owing to the rocky and steep terrain. The porous nature of the region has resulted in the emergence of cross-insurgency, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and, most significantly, the ongoing debate over its legality (The Express Tribune, 2019). According to the 2014 report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan is responsible for cultivating 87% of the global opium supply. Approximately 300 to 500 heroin-producing facilities are currently operational in the Afghan districts of Helmand and Nimroz, which share a border with Pakistan. The securitization of the Durand Line has occurred as a result of the ongoing movement of militants across the border and the military's implementation of operations to eliminate terrorism (Dawn, 2016). Following the implementation of the National Action Plan, the government and establishment of Pakistan have implemented stringent measures for border management. Afghanistan has expressed reservations about these measures, since it feels that they align with the concept of the Durand Line as an internationally recognized boundary, which Afghanistan does not acknowledge. Afghanistan asserts that the independent control of borders is ineffective without the establishment of mutually accepted bilateral agreements (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Pakistan has enhanced border control measures by erecting a barrier at Torkham, implementing a rigorous visa system, employing biometric authentication, and inspecting cargo vehicles. In an attempt to create the illusion of border security, Pakistan closed down eight entrance sites, while still allowing jihadists to have access to 254 other crossing locations. In addition to this, Pakistan made the decision to construct



a barrier along the unguarded border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2017. The decision was made to erect a pair of nine-foot chicken wire fences, with a six-foot spacing, topped with barbed wire. The barrier would be constructed beside the rugged terrain and towering mountains with snow-covered summits reaching an elevation of up to 12,000 feet. In addition, around 750 additional forts and 151 check stations were constructed. Furthermore, it was stated that a cutting-edge surveillance system, consisting of CCTV cameras, drone cameras, and other advanced devices, would be implemented to provide efficient monitoring of the border both during the day and at night. In addition, Biegel radars, IMSAR radars, and search lights would be deployed to enhance night patrolling along the border. 284 The implementation of this unilateral and strict border command and control system results in forcibly pushing back Afghan refugees, which clearly contradicts international human rights and humanitarian law (Geo News, 2017).

Integrating the Copenhagen and Paris Schools

Securitization theory in international relations provides a comprehensive framework for comprehending the process by which issues are transformed into questions of security. This theory is associated with two significant schools of thought: the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. The Copenhagen School, formulated by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, places significant emphasis on the notion of "speech acts" as a fundamental aspect of the securitization process. Securitization, as defined by this school, refers to the process in which a securitizing actor, such as a political leader, designates a specific issue as a threat to a referent object, such as the state. This designation allows for the justification of exceptional actions to address the threat. The efficacy of securitization relies on the endorsement of the securitizing action by a substantial segment of the public. This approach utilizes a constructivist methodology, which centers on the process of how security challenges are socially produced through discourse. The study primarily depends on the examination of political speeches, public remarks, and official documents to track the way topics are presented as security risks. (Siddiqui, 2019).

On the other hand, the Paris School, which is connected to intellectuals such as Didier Bigo, criticizes the Copenhagen School's excessive dependence on verbal actions and emphasizes the significance of bureaucratic practices and sociopolitical circumstances in the process of securitization. The Paris School posits that securitization is not exclusively a consequence of public announcements, but also encompasses many non-discursive actions, including administrative measures, monitoring, and police. It highlights the importance of security experts and technocratic processes in influencing security policy and procedures. This school utilizes a sociological perspective to study the daily activities and routines of security organizations and professionals. It employs tools from sociology and criminology to assess how security policies are implemented and maintained using administrative and technical methods. (Khan, 2016).

The Copenhagen School places its emphasis on the discursive formation of security threats through speech actions, highlighting the significance of language and communication in the process of securitization. The audience's approval of securitization is considered vital. If the public does not



view the issue as a danger, the securitizing action will not succeed. This methodology offers a structure for examining how political leaders and influential individuals shape security risks, which becomes valuable in comprehending the societal and political aspects of the process of securitization. (Gallup Pakistan, 2015)

Conversely, the Paris School emphasizes the pragmatic and routine activities of security experts and organizations, asserting that these acts are essential for comprehending the management and preservation of security. It prioritizes institutional and bureaucratic processes that implement security regulations over audience acceptability. This educational institution provides valuable knowledge on the installation and upkeep of security policies, offering a clear understanding of the functions of different security mechanisms and administrative procedures.

Within the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the Copenhagen School may be employed to examine the political discourse and public declarations that portray Afghan refugees as security risks, thereby justifying the implementation of stringent measures against them. This entails analyzing the remarks and declarations made by Pakistani political and military figures who portray Afghan refugees as a menace to security, especially in the aftermath of notable incidents such as the 2014 Army Public School assault. In contrast, the Paris School specifically examines the procedures of registration, harassment, and monitoring carried out by Pakistani authorities, along with the measures implemented in response to significant security events. This analysis focuses on the examination of certain behaviors and policies that contribute to the securitization of Afghan refugees. These include the execution of the National Action Plan, instances of harassment and discrimination against refugees, and the construction of border fence. Collectively, these methodologies provide a thorough structure for examining the intricate mechanisms of securitization, especially in situations related to migration and refugees. By combining the discursive techniques emphasized by the Copenhagen School with the practical measures highlighted by the Paris School, one may get a more profound comprehension of how Afghan refugees have been subjected to security measures in Pakistan. This thorough examination examines both the political discourse employed to portray refugees as security risks and the precise administrative and bureaucratic procedures that implement these security measures.

Conclusion

This article focused on examining the process of securitization of migration by analyzing the situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Specifically, the goal was to examine how migration has been incorporated into security frameworks that emphasize law enforcement and protection, and how strategies formerly used for addressing traditional security issues started to be applied to themes and issues related to migration. This study has primarily aimed to address the research inquiry on the securitization of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. To do this, a qualitative technique was employed, relying on secondary data and resources. This article employed the securitization theory as understood by the Copenhagen and Paris Schools' to analyze the discourse and policies surrounding the security framing of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Various actors, including the



public, different organizations, government, political parties, and political leaders, were examined in this study. The securitisation paradigm posits that security is a term that is fundamentally disputed. It undergoes construction and processing via many stages. According to the Copenhagen school of thinking, securitization is accomplished through the use of "speech acts or discourses." Not all issues can be securitized. In order for an issue to be considered a security concern, it must undergo three steps: first, there must be a tangible threat to the object in question; second, a powerful actor with the ability to declare it a security concern must be involved; and third, mechanisms and instruments must be used to convince the audience to accept the issue as a security concern. This school proposes the idea of presenting a non-political problem as a security concern through verbal expressions and discussions, which then serves as a justification for implementing exceptional actions. Securitization is the process of determining the actor who securitizes, the dangers being addressed, the referent object for whom the securitization is done, the reasons behind it, the outcomes, and the specific conditions under which it takes place. The advocates of the Paris School embrace a sociological viewpoint. While migration is not explicitly acknowledged as a danger, the methods implemented to control it from a security perspective might classify it as a security challenge. Bigo is recognized as the primary advocate of this particular school of thinking. He has indicated a preference for securitization that is grounded on bureaucratic and technical procedures. The Paris School adopts a Foucauldian perspective, which asserts that the securitization of a particular issue can occur when discursive interpretations are absent. Thus, this article focuses on utilizing securitizing methods and instruments to portray migration as a security risk. This perspective did not disregard the significance of speech actions mentioned to clarify procedures; instead, it focused on the idea that the movement of Afghan refugees to Pakistan has been subjected to security measures without any accusations being made. In light of this context, the research shifted its focus from discussions to actions, examining concrete examples of policy implementation in Pakistan. These examples included policies, policy tools, instruments, and the operational and institutional structures employed by the Pakistani government, as discussed in the fifth article. Moreover, both interpretations of securitization theory demonstrate that Afghan refugees have been subjected to securitization in Pakistan. Specifically, this securitization process was influenced by the prolonged nature of migration and the national interests of the Pakistani state. In international affairs, all states act in accordance with their own national interests, as they possess the autonomy to do so. This research study has examined the viewpoints and narratives of the government from a political standpoint, as well as the perspectives of institutional positions in Pakistan, in light of the securitizing agents. In addition, the fairness and openness of the securitization process have been assessed by considering the perspectives and opinions of those outside of the government, such as academics, security specialists, journalists, attorneys, and human rights activists. This research has examined both the nature of the existing security apparatus to address the danger and its historical background, with the aim of making the conditions more favorable.

Pakistan is not a signatory to either the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1961 Geneva Protocol, as the findings suggest. Furthermore, it has not officially supported any specific rule or regulation



concerning the safety and security of refugees, nor has it established any national laws to clearly identify the refugee status of individuals seeking shelter within its borders. The "Foreigners Act 1946" establishes the protocols for the handling of individuals of foreign origin. The UNHCR is tasked with carrying out refugee status determination as mandated by Pakistan's government, in accordance with the 1993 cooperation agreement between the two entities.



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