



PAK-AFGHAN WATER DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS

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Abstract

Due to their food and electricity requirements, freshwater has become extremely important for the living conditions of nations and sub-nations alike. At the same time, changing climate is negatively affecting its requirement through heat waves, groundwater osmotic pressure and glacier melting. As a colonial identity and being outmoded, water resources between Pakistan and Afghanistan did lack lengthy-term sustainable development. It may not trigger blatant aggression, but it is vulnerable to conflicts between and within. This document examines the threats our western neighbour presented to our water sources and discusses the related institutional framework of their leadership. It examines appropriate ideas, laws, and norms to discover Afghanistan and Pakistan's current policy regime. Finally, the paper aims reinforcing hydro-diplomacy for a stable environment in the region.

Keywords: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Food, Water, Electricity.



Introduction

UN-approved Sustainable Development Goals have shaped and built Pakistan's international management structure, which is in the middle of it. In comparison to the Millennium Development Goals, these goals have a more nuanced and optimistic tone. International policies pursued and implemented on national levels under the guise of global development are given legitimacy by this type of global governance. In order to be a global leader, you must protect and maintain the ecosystem, and water is an essential part of that. It is difficult to find on the global political map, and it is not evenly distributed. There are no borders, no generalisations of laws, and categorization has spread among institutions in this system. Although modern nation-states emphasise independence, self-reliance, and autonomy, the globalist agenda opposes these values. There may be tension between countries over shared resources, such as water, which could lead to conflict (Wolf et al., 2005). Because stakes in water governance are inelastic, distributive, and predicated on the survival of states, it is difficult and complicated. Where political reform has destroyed regimes or institutions, conflict is more likely to erupt and worsen as resources become scarce or institutions become incapable of dealing with it. In 2005, (Giordano et al., 2005), Pakistan's water supply is a valuable resource. Tensions over current water supplies and their use will increase as a result of climate change, decreased rainfall, and population growth. Conflicts may arise within a province or between provinces' competing sectors' customers. Global water conflicts have arisen in the Aral Sea, the Neretva and Trebisnjica Rivers basins, the African Nile Basin, the Tigris and Euphrates, South America Parana River Basin, and the Ganges Basin due to water issues. This is not a misconception. As a result, water management is a top priority for Pakistan, as well as for the region's long-term health, harmony, and safety. It necessitates dialogue between the parties involved, as well as compromise and agreement.

With India, Pakistan has learned that 'water is the most major challenge for the global community,' and it is aware of this. According to (Wouter, 2013): Pakistan's natural waterways are being threatened by an ever-increasing water shortage, severe floods, and droughts. (Sayama and colleagues, 2012) Millions of people in Afghanistan are at risk because of the effects of global climate change on the Kabul River. For more information, please see (Fuchinoute and colleagues, 2002). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan relies on Afghanistan's Kabul River as a source of power and drainage. It covers nine provinces in Afghanistan and supports the lives of more than 25 million people. The only source of drinking water for nearly 7 million Afghans and Pakistanis. In the words of Ramachandran “.



Pakistan has a unique position in the Kabul River's riparian flow, both at the top and bottom. Because of the wide range of environmental factors and the growing global demand for water, the situation in both wetland countries is complex, and there is no water agreement between them. Until now, water has been used in accordance with the needs of each state. Even so, with India's assistance, Afghanistan is now gearing up to construct dams on the Kabul River on its own. The first of these is the "Shahtoot Dam." This has the potential to harm Pakistan's lower wetlands. (Ramachandran, 2018) As a result, resolving the issue by upholding historical rights and finding solutions that benefit both countries is of the utmost importance.

Afghanistan and Pakistan's institutional and constitutional frameworks are examined in this paper, which focuses on Pakistan's water resources. Afghanistan and Pakistan's current water policies are discussed in this article, along with related hypotheses and rules. The paper concluded by outlining a plan for sustainable water management in the region in order to ensure the long-term preservation of the area's ecosystem.

Governance of trans-frontier water

Since 263 transboundary river basins exist, water governance has become a commonplace in today's world. Those basins hold about 60% of the world's fresh water and 46% of its surface area. In the words of Ramachandran, "There's more to it. Transboundary reservoirs serve more than 2 billion people around the world. It's a fact that More than three-quarters of the land in 39 states and 30 countries is surrounded by transboundary river basins. (Puri and colleagues, 2010) More than a dozen countries share the Nile and the Danube rivers. 40% of the world's population lives in river and lake basins that span two or more states (Earthscan, 2010). Flowing water reveals issues of power and dominance. Sharing governance organs means that leadership and management are compounded. The complexity of transboundary water governance in this region has been examined in numerous studies. With regard to Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and India, Biswas looked at the magnitude of and delivery issues, the complexities of management, and the role of international organisations. As per 2011 research by Biswas, "Modality of cooperation and compromise that could contribute to alter" was described by Karajan et al (Janakarajan et al, 2006), while Wolf (Wolf, 2007) saw water as a means of creating certainty and participating in collaboration. "The concern with water is not that water problems disrupt political matters, but that complex political issues create it intractable for the tiniest water issues between states," Malhotra (Malhotra, 2010) wrote. Taking a look at cross-border diplomacy Kliot et al. (Kliot et al., 2001) examined the evolutionary organisational structure of twelve river basins and found scarcity of water resources to be responsible for water disputes, diverse population and poor management. Kliot et al. The frequency of



cooperation between wetland countries has doubled since 1945, according to UNECE / UNESCO's findings. Kliot and colleagues (2001) Water quality and quantity, economic growth, hydroelectric power, and combined management were common paths to collaboration between countries along the riparian zone, despite the fact that water quantity and water systems accounted for 90% of water clashes. As cited in (Gander, 2013) There are a variety of ways in which transboundary water governance can be established. As summarised below, the paper examines Gander theories and ideals: (Kliot et al., 2001)

Theory of Harmon, or Universal Sovereignty

It's gaining traction in the United States and Mexico, where it calls for a state's right to use the waters flowing through its jurisdiction regardless of the impact on other wetland states, including the highest riparian state. It is not widely followed and accepted, despite the fact that it is in direct contravention of current international water law.

a. Territorial sovereignty, or total credibility of the river

There is a right to full flow of natural water in this lower wetland country, and any intervention with the upward state's natural flow must be agreed to by the downstream riparian "whatever the priority." For more information, please see: In contrast to total territorial integrity, it provides an upstream wetland with nearly any amount of water it desires, without any accountability.

Limited Autonomy of Territories

Using "sustainable allocation" (International Law Association, 1956) or "fairer settlement of conflicting countries' interests" (McCaffrey, 2007) or "equal utilisation," every wetland has the right to use an equal amount of water in this situation To put it another way, All wetland states benefit from this middle ground and it is the most widely accepted solution in international conflicts. So that no one is harmed by the use of water, this concept values it. According to other standards and legal standards such as advance consultation, notice, collaboration, agreements in line with the law, this has become the basis of modern international water law.

Interest group

This theory recognizes a wetland communalism of interest between countries, considering the whole basin of the river as an economic entity. Being an expansion of Specific Territorial Autonomy, it goes beyond that by vesting in a collective entity the water rights.



Majority of countries do not tolerate this doctrine. As they believe this concept compels them to reach a deal. Moreover, it is the most suitable rule that ignores nationalism and independence, and the conflicting claims of the various wetland countries.

Transboundary Water Covenants

Nearly 300 watercourse management agreements have been signed around the world. (Kliot et al., 2001) 37 water disputes have erupted since 1948, and 295 water agreements have been reached during the same time period. The fact that 66% of the world's transboundary rivers lack a framework for cooperative management notwithstanding (Sanchez and Roberts, 2014). The United Nations is responsible for a large number of international agreements and treaties. Furthermore, the (ILA) is an important part of water law and has made a number of statements on foreign law. It is not possible to include Pakistan and Afghanistan because they are signatories to the majority of the Conventions. In Pakistan and Afghanistan's view, the following are the most important aspects of international water law:

a. Declaration 1911 in Madrid

River basin changes can't be made without taking into account the lower wetland's interests, and the collective water board can make decisions on behalf of the entire basin. Rehabilitation of existing facilities and new construction in state territories are also on the agenda. (United Nations Environment Analysis, 2016).

b. Helsinki Rules for the Use of International Rivers Waters 1966.

These are based on the "Equitable Utilization" theory, which emphasises the importance of using rather than sharing resources. So that each basin state has a legal claim to these waters for "advantageous purposes," and so that each basin state has a stake in the management of those waters. This legislation is in jeopardy because of rising water resources. It is not just land and air that are affected by environmental and human rights issues, but the waters of the planet as well.

c. 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Anti-navigational Use of Global Watercourses

Transboundary waters are governed by this standard law. In this chapter, we'll talk about water use, the necessity of establishing a system for exchanging water-related data, and the advancement of mechanisms for resolving water disputes.

Rule on Water sources at Berlin Conference 2004



These rules take into account everything that has transpired since the Helsinki Rules came into effect. They are designed to deal with droughts that cross national borders. These rules are essential because they allow people who are affected by shared waterways to participate in water-related proceedings. (Aziz, 2016)

In 2500 BC, two Sumerian city states, Lagash and Umma, signed the first international water agreement over the Tigris River to resolve a water share dispute. The author (Aziz, 2016) states: More than 3600 agreements have been signed between 805 AD and 1984, with the bulk of the agreements relating to delimitation and transport. In recent decades, water agreements have shifted their focus to water resource utilisation, advancement, and conservation. In spite of disagreements over other issues, countries have legally binding agreements to share water resources.. In 1995, Israel and Jordan signed a treaty exchanging the Jordan River (Transboundary Water, 2008) Indian-Bangladesh-Bhutan-India Ganges Water Sharing Treaty signed in 1996 and the Indian-Pakistan Indus Water Agreement are examples of this water collaboration.

Water Governance between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Waters of Afghanistan. In total, Afghanistan has 61 million acres of water resources (MAF). Salman et al. It has one of the world's lowest water storage per capita ratios. As a percentage of the population, Afghanistan ranks higher than Pakistan (0.97) and Iran (0.65) in terms of annual water availability (1.13 AF). As of 2016, (Salman and Niazi, 2016), Just one third of Afghanistan's water is put to use each day. Streams supply about 85 percent of the water used, while alluvial groundwater and springs supply the rest. "Qureshi, 2002" (Qureshi) There are many rivers in Afghanistan that are fed by the Hindukush rains and ice melt. Only 27% of the population has access to safe drinking water, despite the fact that 7.9 million hectares of farmland are used to provide it. As per Qureshi (2002), Four of the basins are transboundary rivers: Kabul/Indus River, Amu Darya, Helmand River, Harirud Basin, and Murghab Basin. The other two basins are in Afghanistan. Several countries in the region share them, including Pakistan and Iran. A water management agreement signed by Helmand and Afghanistan and Iran is the only one of its kind.

A significant portion of Pakistan's water use comes from Afghanistan. 16-17 percent of Pakistan's water supply comes from the Kabul River. In accordance with Malyar (2016), In addition to the major Kabul stream, major rivers such as Kurram and Shimal flow from Paktia, Afghanistan to former (FATA) and North Waziristan in Pakistan. Afghanistan's South Waziristan agency receives Ghazni gomall. The Kabul River's tributaries form a delta in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. UNEP, 2009) The Kabul River basin is home to 37 percent of Afghanistan's population, making it the most populous basin in the



country. As of 2016, (Mustaf, 2016) The Kabul River provides about 26% of Afghanistan's water resources. In 2015, (MiCT) Hundreds of thousands of Afghans depend on it for their daily survival. The Kabul River and its tributaries are the only sources of water for the province of KP (Lashkaripour and Hussaini, 2008).

Kabul River's main tributary is the Kunar River, which begins in Chitral, Pakistan and joins the Kabul River in Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan has unique water rights due to its location both upstream and downstream. More than 300,000 hectares of heavily irrigated zones, including more than 50,000 hectares in Pakistan, are supported by the Kabul basin. Afghanistan is now working to restore its watering system and make better use of the Kabul River's water supply. Together with climate change and rising demands and concerns about safety in the water supply make it extremely difficult to manage the situation. Due to a lack of trust, both countries have attempted to reach an agreement on the Kabul River several times over the last decade.

Water Governance-Afghanistan

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Diverse Institutions

The Ministry of Mines and the National Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for protecting land and groundwater from pollution, respectively. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Forest and Tribal Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior are responsible for transboundary water bodies.

Afghanistan signed transboundary agreements with the United Kingdom (Kabul River Basin) in 1921, Iran (Helmand River Basin) in 1973, 1873, 1946, and Russia (Kabul River Basin) in 1958, all of which were transboundary agreements (Amudarya River Basin). For the Panj-Amudarya River Basin, an agreement was reached with Tajikistan in 2014 regarding the exchange of hydrological data. For example, it explains how dangerous and extreme hydrometeorological events are communicated and how disputes are handled. In 2016, Iran and Afghanistan agreed to sign a new MoU on the implementation of the 1973 Helmand Water Treaty on transboundary waters. Afghanistan is being included in the Amu River and Aral Sea Save International Fund control organisations. The Afghan government has designated twenty-nine large, medium, and small dams for the future. in the work of Lashkaripour and Hussain, When it comes to transboundary waters, Pakistan has a lot to answer for. She also had plans to build a 1500-megawatt hydroelectric dam on the Kunar River, but it appears that these have been shelved due to the current political climate in the region.

In the Pakistani Waters



Pakistan's agricultural community relies on water as a safety net. Between 1995 and 1999, the availability of safe drinking water was also reduced. 48 With over 5,000 ice caps and "hyper deserts," Pakistan is on track to run out of water by 2025. "No one in Pakistan will be resistant to this shortages," says one expert, "either from the north with its more than 5,000 ice caps." Pakistan's average annual consumption of freshwater is 0.97 AF per capita. While Pakistan receives 145 MAF of water each year, it only manages to conserve 13.7 MAF of that amount. 40 MAF of water is needed for this. Over 122,268 waterways are part of Pakistan's irrigation system which includes three channels, nineteen dams, twelve inter-river canals and 45 individual channels. There are more than ninety-one (91) million hectares of land in the Indus River Basin, which includes the Indus and its 27 tributaries, including the Jhelum (Chenab), Ravi (Ravi), Sutlej (Sutlej), and the Beas. The (Hanasz, 2011) This Basin contains nearly all of Pakistan's agricultural land. About 65 percent of Pakistan's water is used by 31 million hectares in this basin. In 2014, (Thoma) More than 150 miles off Pakistan's coast has been invaded by seawater due to dry conditions in the Indus River Delta. (United Nations Atomic Energy Agency, 2016) In these circumstances, the minimum period of time between surface water supply replacements is given additional consideration (lakes and rivers). As a result of a combination of population growth and poor management, floods and dwindling water supplies are becoming more common. In fact, water scarcity and management are becoming major concerns as urbanisation and industrialization grow at such a rapid pace. Managing Pakistan's water resources. We don't have an organised water strategy because of the way the law is currently written. "Pakistan's regulatory regime is an excellent product of widely accepted practises, largely based on usual procedures principles," says a study by the International Water Management Institute. As of 2016, (Packer, 2016). The 1976 Territorial Water and Maritime Zones Act, the 1992 Indus River System Authority Ordinance, the 1910 Electricity Act, and the 1965 Electricity Control Regulations are all state laws. Each of the three provinces has its own Canal and Sewage Act 1873, Sindh Irrigation Act 1879, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Canal and Sewage Act 1873.

The 1991 Water Allocation Agreement on the Trying to Share of Indus Basin Waters between Provinces was the most important piece of water legislation after the Indus Water Treaty. Based on the historical water use of the provinces, it includes Punjab (47 percent), Sindh (42 percent), KP (eight percent), and Baluchistan (three percent). "Integrated water resource control system" was proposed in 2009 by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). However, there is no system for sharing transboundary aquifers and watersheds, such as exchanging real-time flow information. The Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, the National Environment Policy, the Policy on Drinking Water and Sanitation, the National Climate Change Policy, and the National Energy Conservation Policy all have an impact on Pakistan's water resources. Pakistan Water Resources Strategy



(World Bank), Pakistan Water Resources Strategy Study (Asian Development Bank), Pakistan Water Resources Technical Committee and WAPDA Report 2010 are some of the documentation that is not an initiative or a conduct, but is part of the water sector (Baloch, 2018) With the help of international donors (the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the UNDP), the government has launched a number of water schemes aimed at enhancing food security, increasing agricultural output, maintaining sewage systems, and establishing Farmers' Organizations, among other things.

Due to the 1991 Water Agreement, Pakistan's water agencies and governance are divided between federal and provincial levels, involving many major companies. As long as water remains a province-specific issue, the federal government takes on administrative and equitable responsibilities. The Parliamentary Water Resources Committee is a prominent federal watchdog. The Federal Ministry of Water and Power regulates the authority for water and power production at the highest federal level. The 1958 WAPDA Act and the 1992 (IRSA) Act form the basis of the country's government structure. WAPDA proposes huge storage plants for water, based on IRSA results. Other relevant organisations include the Federal Flood Council and the Pakistan Meteorological Department. Flows of water in the province are controlled by the Provincial Drainage Agencies. Desalination, Irrigation, and Drainage Committees, Departments of Agriculture, and Environmental Agencies are some of the most significant provincial departments. (CCI, 1991).

Impasse on Water Governance

Once partitioning took place and the Punjab's Eastern Rivers were used to develop an agricultural economy, India was able to restore eastern Punjab and resettle over 4 million displaced people. Reliance on those waters created problems for Pakistan further down the line. Negotiations with the World Bank, a sponsor of numerous projects in Pakistan and India, were successful in resolving the issue. It was a well-thought-out technical treaty that ignored the Kashmir dispute by focusing on the Indus River system. Bhutta and Smedema (2007) found that As the most prominent example of international water cooperation, the Indus Waters Treaty shows the conflicting statements between an upstream and downstream riparian in this case. Kamal and coworkers (2014a) As a result of the Indus Waters Agreement, Pakistan and India were able to negotiate even during periods of political unrest because water issues were kept separate from other thorny issues. It provides a framework for regulating the Kabul River's water supply between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan's farming industry needs about 16 MAF and has a surplus of about 45 MAF. ' River Kabul has a flow of 14.6 MAF before it joins the Chitral, Swat, and Kunar rivers.



Upon reaching Pakistan, Warsak's flow increases to an impressive 17 MAF. The combined MAF from Swat and Rivers Kunar is 2.4 MAF more. Drainage from the Indus River is used to fertilise 17.2 million hectares of Pakistani soil. It uses dams and storage facilities to maintain an average flow of 143.1 million gallons per year. As of 2014, (Salman and Niazi et al., By utilising the Indus Basin Treaty's irrigation system, Pakistan increased its irrigated landmass. Afghanistan's need for hydropower projects is greater because the Kabul basin has limited drainage capacity. Only 3% of the total water flow to Pakistan would be reduced if the proposed dams in the Kabul Basin, including Shatoot, Gulbahar and Baghdara as well as Gambiri, Kama and Kunar, were built, according to a World Bank report in 2013. The year is 2014 (Adelphi). A rise in the flow between January and March, followed by a decline between April and June, is all that these schemes do, according to the research. Sarfraz (2013, Sarfraz) Despite this, the findings should be scrutinised for inconsistencies. The annual and periodic (Rabi and Kharif) flows of the Kabul River were also studied by the (IUCN) in 2010 to evaluate changes over time. The Kabul River's annual water flows may have also been studied to see if there are any demographic trends in the river. The Kabul River's annual flow decreased from 28 MAF to 19 MAF, which may have been due to climate change. There was a 1:3 ratio between the minimum and maximum average distributions for scientific studies. As of 2013, (Aziz, 2013). This significant sum raises a number of troubling issues. Climate change, water scarcity, or diverting more water to other uses in Afghanistan are all plausible explanations for the observed differences. Another important dynamic is the difference between Pakistan's and Afghanistan's water laws and regulations, i.e., management. For example, the State, Frontiers and Regions Ministry does not have control over the KP Rivers. FATA's drainage agency does not regularly provide government data, with the exception of IRSA (Ahmad, 2010). Pakistan, on the other hand, has special water laws (marine, hydel, etc.) while Afghanistan does not.

An agreement on water resources between Pakistan and Afghanistan was established in 2003 with the help of a nine-member technological council. This failed due to Afghanistan's refusal to share river flow data. WAPDA sent a team to Khost in 2005 to look into the possibility of rebuilding the Shamil / Kaitu hydroelectric power plant. Reciprocal agreement was reviewed by the World Bank in 2006 with the help of the World Bank. This, too, ended in defeat. (MiCT). There was a moment in May 2009 when the Islamabad Declaration became the most optimistic joint statement between the two countries. (MiCT) Transportation, commerce, electricity, farming and workforce development were some of the topics covered. However, no steps were taken to formalise the Kabul River Basin Cooperation Process.



In 2013, the finance ministers of the two countries met to discuss a Kabul River combined-power project. In 2014, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Mutual Chambers of Commerce followed up on their promise to discuss a control-sharing arrangement. To examine the construction of the two dams on the Kabul River, the World Bank scheduled a meeting between the Pakistani and Afghan ministries of water and international affairs to establish data exchange procedures. An Economic Cooperation Conference in 2009 stated: No collaborative dam research techniques were used by either side.

As a way to secure transboundary wetland treaties, Afghanistan's President accepted the Extension Policy on Transboundary Waters in October 2015. Pakistan has also informed the World Bank that it is willing to continue the talks. In the course of a four-year investigation, 3000 glacial lakes were discovered, 36 of which were deemed dangerous. (MiCT) The groundwork has been laid for further cooperation on transboundary water resources.

In our previous conversation, we talked about the stakes between the two countries, the inevitable deadlock that results, and the potential for cooperation. In addition, the region's fractious politics continue to obstruct any progress on water governance. Pakistan and Afghanistan's water policies have been affected by the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Indus Water Agreement, in particular India's construction of dams in Kashmir. (MiCT).

The Going Forward

The shared treaties, on the other hand, have been in place for a long time. Thirty-seven incidents of violence have occurred over the past several decades, but there have also been 150 riparian treaties. As stated earlier (King and Sturtewagen, 2010) Because 'South Asian hydropower policy calls for institutional collaboration,' Afghanistan and Pakistan need to establish an effective framework for transboundary water sharing immediately.' According to guidelines set forth by water management frameworks, this collaboration should be facilitated:

The TWINS (Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus) matrix recognises that conflict and cooperation exist simultaneously. Through an examination of wetland countries' power structures, this model examines how low disparity exists alongside low cooperation or higher conflict. "(Chellaney, 2011).

There are four guiding principles laid out by the Dublin Meeting on Water and the Environment (1992), all of which require attention to freshwater resources' temporal and



spatial variability, as well as water users' desires and stakeholder involvement (Savenije and Zaag, 2002)

Theoretical 'game' models can also be helpful. This is a situation in which both parties must clearly define the parameters of their cooperation and disagreement in order to reach an agreement on how to maximise their shared gains while minimising their losses through cooperative action (Qaddumi, 2008).

The Temple's classical framework consists of three parts. The "administrative pillar" relies heavily on cross-industry technological cooperation. Political pillar, for an open atmosphere; "institutional, for creating/enforcing/creating/institutional production of legislation" are the other two pillars, respectively. For example, when political will or legal and institutional agreements are lacking, a pillar can be damaged or destroyed.

The Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) is a counter-argument to more traditional, technologically-focused approaches. Systems and value-creation are not based on a zero-sum mentality. Rather than being a fixed resource, water can be used in many different ways. To put it another way, peace talks function "as the centre of diagnosis and intervention." (Islam and Repella, 2015)

Hydro-Diplomacy

By comparing the designs shown above, one can deduce that the negotiating process or diplomacy is a common theme. Keeping peace and security at the top of diplomats' priority lists necessitates maintaining stakeholder engagement through both direct and indirect networks. Pakistan and Afghanistan's asymmetrical power-sharing underscores the importance of diplomacy. As riparians, they are wary of international cooperation. (Pohl and colleagues, 2017) Hydro diplomacy, rather than electric water management, should be the focus of the Afghanistan dam strategy, despite the disputed consequences of this approach. Hydro-diplomacy can connect existing power structures and channels to make political processes more efficient... If a comprehensive resolution isn't possible, they should try to reach a basic political agreement. It is imperative that both Afghanistan and Pakistan make the most of the synergies that can be found between "strong" and "soft" policies, and that they distinguish between international, economic, and environmental goals. In the current political climate, it is possible that neither goal will be met in full. It's not just a matter of geography, but also of law and justice. Afghanistan already has a weak institutional structure, and the misallocation, oppression, and water waste could exacerbate the lack of predictability in management.



River Basin Organizations (RBO) have been established by donors to promote regional cooperation and minimise conflict over shared freshwater habitats. States face economic and social costs from anti-cooperation that goes to the root of disputes. Economic and social development linked to water can improve local harmony and integration. Investing in water resources institutions will prevent these disputes from arising in the first place. Many regional cooperation organisations (RBOs) have benefited from financial support from international donors, such as the Indus Waters Treaty, Mekong River Commission, and Nile Basin Initiative. (Pohl and colleagues, 2017) It is expected that hydro-diplomacy related to water leadership will accomplish various goals, such as crisis resolution and joint development management, as a result of this approach.

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have the option of continuing "business as usual" in a climate of distrust, or they can work together to manage and use their water resources. Handling transboundary water will prevent water crises, improve national security, improve the atmosphere, and bring together both communities. In order to be successful, electro-centric water management must be supplemented by "hydro-diplomacy."

Conclusion

The regulation of water across international borders is a complex process that involves multiple routes, numerous international laws, and a variety of principles. Natural, social, financial, and hydro-political factors must all be taken into consideration when deciding on a course of action. Despite the importance of legal and technical solutions for cross-border water management, the Pakistan and Afghanistan milieu failed to achieve the same. The UN Conference of 1997 and the Berlin Rules of 2004 provide a clear legal framework for collaboration, but political will and confidence are still required. The history of water management between the two states shows that this approach cannot be sustained by financial hardships while managing their shared river systems without a settlement or contract. Afghanistan must have lasting peace. When it comes to "hydro-diplomacy," both riparians should actively pursue it. The Water Diplomacy Framework is seen as a significant step forward by many. It would aid in the development of favourable conditions for the combination of water resources institutions. Anticipation and a preventive hydro-diplomacy that builds confidence to lay the groundwork for water coordination are the miracle cures for long-term peace and stability in our environment.



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