



CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN PAKISTAN DURING THE ELECTED REGIME OF PML - N (2013-2018)

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Abstracts

Pakistan's seventy-five-year history has been marked by turbulent civil-military ties, resulting in many military dictatorships. The smooth transfer of power between two democratically elected civilian administrations in May 2013 represented a significant milestone since it was the first instance of such a transition between two civilian governments. The Pakistan army perceives itself as the guardian of the nation, responsible for safeguarding the nation from both internal and external threats. During his 2013 election campaign, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pledged to play a more prominent role in military and security matters, traditionally under the purview of the military. This research study focuses on the dynamics of civil-military relations during the third term of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz administration, spanning from 2013 to 2018. An analysis has been conducted on significant events that have caused disagreements between the civilian government and the powerful military. The purpose of this analysis is to gain insight into the kind of regime and to assess the effectiveness of the elected government in asserting its constitutional authority in the face of a powerful military. The study aims to analyze civil-military interactions from 2013 to 2018 using qualitative content analysis. It focuses on major political events reported by national print and electronic media.

Keywords: *CMR, civilian control, internal and external threats, regime, democracy*



Introduction

The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz is a centrist-right political party in Pakistan. It is among the top three political parties in Pakistan based on its membership. In 1993, after the disintegration of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (I.J.I), Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister, founded this political party. The party's conservative platform promotes tax reductions, protection of private property rights, and the establishment of a free market economy. Nawaz Sharif was born in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1949. After the partition of India in 1947, his family migrated from East Punjab, India. In the early 1970s, under the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the steel mill owned by the Sharif family was seized by the government (Baxter, 1991). The Sharifs were among many families who held a deep-seated grudge against the PPP and Z.A. Bhutto. They passionately championed the army's cause after Zia assumed power in 1977, and the family business was subsequently returned to them. Prior to assuming the position of Prime Minister, he held the positions of Finance Minister and subsequently Chief Minister of Punjab. Mian Nawaz Sharif became a member of the Pakistan Muslim League in 1985. After the Zia regime finished in 1988, the Pakistan Muslim League formed a coalition with the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (I.J.I), a conservative alliance, in the election. The election was won by the Pakistan People's Party. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan ousted the PPP administration on allegations of corruption. After the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad won the elections, the next step was to choose a new Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif used his Punjabi background to persuade several Generals of his suitability for the position, ultimately leading to his appointment as Prime Minister in November 1990.

However, the PML had a group that endorsed Junejo's candidature for prime minister. This faction seceded from PML in 1993. The name of the remaining group was changed to PML-Nawaz. Nawaz's campaign motto was "continuing Zia's agenda" (reviving the economy and promoting Islamization in Pakistan). The PMLN administration was ousted due to allegations of corruption. In 1997, the party reclaimed power and shifted towards a more conservative stance. In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf staged a military coup, resulting in the ousting of the PMLN administration. Following the end of the Musharraf regime in 2008, the PML-N made a big comeback. In 2013, it had incredible success by securing Nawaz's third term as prime minister. The PML-N remains the most prominent faction within the PML (Pakistan Muslim League), which comprises many factions including as Nawaz, Quaid, E. Azam group. Over time, the group's political orientation has been gradually moving back towards the center. It aims to blend economic prosperity and liberalization alongside liberal democracy. The PML (N) now maintains a religious orientation that is entirely moderate. Furthermore, it favours the use of force to combat radical religious factions.

During the previous regime of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the following key events characterized the interaction between the powerful military and the elected government from 2013 to 2018. These events demonstrate how the elected regime was unable to control the powerful military aided by the Judiciary and the military controlled print and electronic media.



1. Pervez Musharraf Trial

One of the first and most important occurrences in civil-military relations between 2013 and 2018 was the PML-N federal government's decision to pursue a treason prosecution against General (Retd) Pervez Musharraf for his imposition of emergency in violation of the constitution in November 2007 (Afzal, 2019). He was charged as a result of this decision on May 31, 2014. As the later events will demonstrate the trial of General Musharraf severely harmed civil-military ties in Pakistan. Shortly after assuming the position of Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif announced in parliament his intention to prosecute Musharraf for "high treason," which refers to any act aimed at overthrowing or suspending the constitution. Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif from power and then exiled him for a duration of seven years.

PM Nawaz Sharif provided reassurance to the assembly that General [Retired] Musharraf will face trial for his actions on November 3, 2007, which involved the dissolution of the Supreme Court, the detention of all judges, and the infliction of torture upon them due to the chief justice's refusal to comply with his unlawful directives (Dawn, 2013). As per Article 6 of the Constitution, which mandates capital punishment, "he will be prosecuted in accordance with that clause."

. In order to know the alleged offense, it is crucial to examine Section 3 of the High Treason Act and Section 5 of the Constitutional Provision (Special Court Act) in relation to the complaint. General (Rtd) Pervez Musharraf faced a complaint accusing him of three offenses: the suspension of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973; the unauthorized implementation of Article 270-A through the Constitution (Amendment) Order 2007; and the unlawful control of the courts by Musharraf's regime. The trial for treason of General Pervez Musharraf was conducted by a panel of three judges, namely Justice Faisal Arab, Justice Yawar Ali Khan, and Justice Tahira Safdar (Dawn,2013) (Nation,2014).

A special panel was established by the Supreme Court, under the supervision of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, to prosecute the former president for the offense of high treason. Musharraf was accused of high treason on five counts by the PML-N administration. Furthermore, a tripartite panel was established to adjudicate the issue. Musharraf was summoned by a special court to respond to allegations of treason. In an interview, the ex-military commander expressed his plea for "forgiveness" over any potential wrongdoings that may have occurred during his nine-year tenure as the chief of the armed forces (Dawn, 2013). Musharraf was hospitalised due to a cardiac ailment while en route to a special court hearing for the high treason charge filed against him (New York Times, 2014). As a result of his poor condition, no arrest warrant was issued. General Raheel Sharif, the head of the army, spoke out against the trial of former President Musharraf for high treason. He stated that the army will protect its reputation and pride in response to the unwarranted criticism of the institution in recent times (VOA, 2014). Due to health concerns, the ex-president requested a one-time permission to go abroad. Following the Supreme Court's ruling to remove Musharraf's name from the ECL, he was free to pursue medical treatment abroad.



Musharraf was convicted of a grave offence against the state by a specialist court in Islamabad on December 17, 2019. Consequently, he received death penalty in compliance with Article 6 of the Constitution (BBC, 2019). Musharraf was the first military dictator in Pakistan's history, who was convicted of the grave offense of high treason and was punished. Major General Asif Ghafoor expressed that the Pakistan Armed Forces' lower-ranking members had reluctantly and sorrowfully accepted the special court's verdict while defending Musharraf. According to the ISPR statement, it is unimaginable for a former Army Chief, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and President of Pakistan, who dedicated over four decades to serving his country and participated in wars for national security, to be considered a traitor. The observed violation pertains to the correct legal procedure, including the formation of special court for the trial, the denial of the fundamental right to self-defense, the use of procedures tailored to individual cases, and the fast resolution of the matter. He stated, "The Pakistani Armed Forces anticipate that justice will be administered in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan" (Washington Post, 2019)." Upon discovering that its former chief was being charged with treason, the Army saw a decline in morale. Alternatively, the judicial proceedings against General (rtd) Pervez Musharraf created tension between the powers of civilian and military administration. Gen Raheel Sharif exerted his authority as Chief of Army Staff to convince Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government to stop its efforts in prosecuting General (rtd) Pervez Musharraf. This particular case sowed the seed of discord between the civilian government and the army from the very beginning which latter on worsened the relations on many other occasions.

2. The Army Public School Attack

The students of Army Public School in Peshawar, KPK, were the target of a terrorist attack on December 16, 2014, perpetrated by seven TTP-affiliated shooters. As soon as the terrorists entered the school, they opened fire on the students and teachers. Army Public School is managed by the Army Public School and College Systems, which oversees 146 institutions throughout Pakistan. The terrorists, who were armed with grenades and automatic weapons, advanced right toward the auditorium in the centre of the campus and opened fire on the children gathered there for First Aid training. The attackers wanted to kill as many pupils as they could, according to Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), rather than detain them as hostages (Tribune, 2014) (BBC, 2014) (HRW, 2017). Following the incident at the Army public school, a 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism was released. The Army also had a hand in this. It also lifted the moratorium on executions and stated its intention to swiftly execute terrorists who had been found guilty of crimes. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority will be strengthened and given more authority (NACTA) (Haq, 2016) (Khattak, 2017). All four provinces were to get units of a federal counterterrorism force. To improve counter-terrorism measures, the criminal justice system is also expected to be revamped and changed, including giving provincial Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs) the authority to intercept terrorist communications. The terrorist attack on the army public school demonstrated the poor performance of Pakistan's political elite and civilian authority. Military tribunals were established in Pakistan's largest cities as a result of a last-minute addition (the 21st amendment) to the Pakistani Constitution of 1973 on January 7, 2015, and



revisions to the Pakistan Army Act of 1952 on January 6. Due to inadequacies in the judicial system, military courts were established to ensure that offenders would not get away with their crimes (Javed, 2021).

The purpose of establishing military tribunals, according to Syed Khursheed Shah, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, is to expedite the conviction of terrorists because our court system has so many defects and has been ineffectual (Nation, 2014). In spite of assurances that military courts would be temporary, on March 31, 2017, following the expiration of the 21st Amendment, Parliament passed the 23rd Amendment and modifications to the Army Act to extend the authority of military tribunals over civilians (Zubair, 2019). The changes entered into force immediately on January 7, 2017, and were scheduled to expire two years later (ICJ, 2019). Despite prior claims that the amendments would expire on January 6, 2019, the extended military court power expired on March 30, 2019, two years after the 23rd Amendment went into effect (Omar, 2019).

The APS attack has strengthened the military's position in Pakistan and strengthened its resolve to combat at least some radicals, rather than weakening it and preventing it from fighting Islamists. First, the attack that claimed the lives of so many soldiers' children has sparked a strong desire among civilians to support the military, whose soldiers and commanders are not only fighting on the front lines but also losing loved ones in tragic ways. The army seems to be the savior more than ever in such a warlike atmosphere. Third, the forces showed extraordinary fortitude. Military power surpassed its limits both in terms of security policymaking and by highlighting the COAS's profile on the global stage. A number of political analysts have observed that the military's expanding role has brought it into aspects of civilian administration where it might not have been, as required by the army's ethics code.

3. PTI and PAT sit-in

In the midst of claims of extensive vote manipulation in the 2013 general election, Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) initially accepted the election results, but wanted a probe into electoral fraud in four constituencies as a litmus test for the remainder of the election. In response to government delay, the PTI organised many jalsas in Punjab, the electoral bastion of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Masood, 2014). Imran Khan asserted in August 2014 that the PTI has endeavored to employ legal means to bring the fraud's perpetrators to justice for 14 months. The administration did nothing despite the party presenting a 2,100-page white paper with evidence of vote-rigging. Khan claims that in any democracy, the Supreme Court would have ruled the results illegitimate and called for new elections (NDTV, 2014). Afzal Khan, a former additional secretary for the Election Commission of Pakistan, also alleged fraud (GEO, 2014), but the Supreme Court took no action. The case to cancel the election was denied because there was insufficient evidence to sustain Afzal Khan's accusations, which the court finally found were false.

Throughout the protests, Imran Khan expressed his displeasure with the electoral commission's



treatment of his accusations as well as the country's justice system's inaction. On April 22, 2014, the PTI announced that their anti-corruption drive has begun. Khan's declaration prompted the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) party, led by Islamic cleric Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, to organize a rally as well. It was assumed that the two marches may merge however the PAT called its march "Inqilab march" to prevent confusion with the PTI protest. Imran Khan and Tahir ul Qadri did not combine their protest gatherings or publicly criticise one another, as was expected. According to Qadri, the Inqilab March, an independent march organized by his party, would take place in conjunction with the PTI's Azadi march on August 10 (BBC, 2014) (ARY, 2014). It soon became clear that the parties had similar objectives but different strategies, despite the marches being organised on separate routes that mirror one other.

Speculation over a potential collaboration between the PTI and PAT arose as opposition groups scheduled parallel marches. There was an unwritten understanding to help one another even if there was never a formal alliance between the parties. The press was notified by Qadri and Khan on August 11 that there will be two unofficially coordinated marches in support of overthrowing the Sharif administration.

On August 15, 2014, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in the capital of Pakistan to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In Islamabad, protesters led by opposition leader Imran Khan and cleric Tahir ul-Qadri offered the greatest challenge yet to Nawaz Sharif's administration, which has been in office for one year. Khan and Qadri's followers have promised to camp out in Islamabad as long as Nawaz Sharif refuses to resign. At a time when the military was waging an operation against Pakistani Taliban terrorists in the country's lawless tribal areas and when the influence of sectarian militant organisations was growing, the disturbance generated security concerns for Pakistan (Kronstadt&Kumar, 2014). Other opposition parties distanced themselves from Khan's call for civil disobedience on August 18 after the demonstration failed to attract the large crowds he had hoped for.

Members of the PMLN asserted that the demonstrations were being covertly supported by the army, which has a problematic relationship with Nawaz Sharif. The military was upset with the administration, especially since Pervez Musharraf, the former president and chief of the army, was facing treason charges. In addition, there have been disputes over how to handle the Pakistani Taliban between the army and the civilian. The military ultimately launched an operation despite the government's insistence on holding peace negotiations. As Nawaz Sharif spent most of 2014 tied down in disagreements with the powerful military, tens of thousands of protesters camped out in front of the prime minister's house, calling for his resignation. During the rallies, rumours emerged that the military was planning a coup to depose Sharif. Sharif allegedly allowed the military to make foreign policy choices in order to protect his authority.

4. Dawn Leaks

The October 2016 article in the Dawn newspaper about a rumored scuffle between the civilian



administration and the military during a meeting generated a political outcry in the country, which swiftly escalated into a crisis including news leaks before becoming a national press content. According to reports, Dawn writer Cyril Almeida "leaked classified meeting minutes" when government and military leaders met to discuss "national action plan." According to the report, the civilian government informed the army of intensifying international concerns so that military could conduct more operations against extremist organizations.

The military ranks became a hornet's nest after the representatives of the civilian administration warned that Pakistan could suffer diplomatic isolation if the security apparatus did not take the advised course of action (ARY, 2017). The government appointed a committee to investigate the October 6, 2016 story that detailed a high-level civil-military meeting to examine the matter of proscribed organizations active in Pakistan. The military put pressure on the government to launch an investigation into the incident in order to determine who leaked the meeting's material after the administration initially rejected the claim. Later, the commission launched an investigation to find out who gave material from the meeting to Cyril Almeida, who wrote the article.

Due to the publishing of the report, Pervaiz Rasheed was removed from his job as minister of information; the administration considered Rasheed should have told the news outlet not to publish it (Aljazeera, 2016). Dawn reaffirmed their position in an Editor's note issued on October 11, 2016, stating that the report was "confirmed, cross-checked, and fact-checked." Cyril Almeida's name was added to the Exit Control List (ECL) after the report was made public, but the interior ministry subsequently removed him after receiving criticism from the press and human rights activists (Dawn, 2016).

In order to clearly identify culpability, discover goals and purposes, and unearth all those responsible for this event for serious punishment in the national interest, the Government of Pakistan established an inquiry committee of senior ISI, MI, and IB officers. Justice Retired Aamer Raza Khan presided over the seven-member committee tasked with investigating the Dawn leaks. The committee consisted of the Establishment Secretary, the Punjab Ombudsman, the Director of the FIA Punjab, and one representative from ISI, MI, and IB (Dawn, 2016). Initial press accounts indicated that the committee had thirty days to publish its report.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif gave a series of directions, including the firing of his special assistant on international affairs, Tariq Fatemi, and action against Rao Tehsin, the chief information officer, according to the report. Within hours of their publication, the army officially rejected the proposals (Tribune, 2017). Unexpected was interior minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan's criticism of the army's use of social media to express opinions on an inside issue that should have been addressed through normal channels (VOA, 2017). Clearly, the army was unhappy with the government's response to an investigation into a Dawn newspaper article that compared the military and civilian approaches to battling terrorist groups.



5. Panama Papers

For the first time, 11.5 million private documents were made public by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). The files, created by the Panamanian legal firm Mossack Fonseca, include client information for more than 214,488 offshore companies (ICIJ, 2016). It was asserted that eight offshore companies were connected to Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, and the family of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Maryam, Hassan, and Hussain, the children of the Prime Minister, "were proprietors or had the power to authorize transactions for many companies," according to documents published on the ICIJ website.

The Panama Leaks give new life to the accusations of fraud that have plagued the Sharif family for years. Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and other party members reaffirm their position on the allegations of corruption against the prime minister and demand that the government take immediate action to address them. In the Panama Papers case, which is frequently referred to as "Panamgate" in the local press, this marks the beginning of a procedure that could take up to a year to complete.

Nawaz Sharif spoke to the nation via Pakistan Television (PTV) after recognizing that staying mute may make things worse. Prior to beginning his speech, the prime leader hinted that he will not be utilizing the government to resolve a personal matter. Nawaz Sharif, who was obviously agitated, proclaims that he is open to the formation of a judicial body to investigate his family's alleged wealth in foreign tax havens (Reuters, 2016). Imran Khan asked that CJP to lead the commission investigating the Panama scandal. The panel of inquiry should be presided over by former Chief Justice of Pakistan Anwar Zaheer Jamali, according to Imran Khan, who wanted it to be constituted immediately (ANI, 2017). Instead, the government was eager to include former judges on the panel. However five former Judges declined to head an investigation commission. A government panel lead by Finance Minister Ishaq Dar has finalized the terms of reference (ToRs) for the forthcoming Panama Papers investigation commission (Dawn, 2016). The ToRs were developed to outline the objectives of the investigation. It was evident that this matter would be controversial.

On July 10, 2017, notwithstanding their differences, the JIT submitted a 275-page report to the Supreme Court. According to the report, the NAB was instructed to file a case under Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance against Nawaz Sharif, his daughter Maryam Nawaz, and his sons. Maryam Nawaz was identified as the beneficial owner of Nielsen and Nescoll, and according to JIT, Nawaz Sharif, his sons, and Maryam Nawaz were unable to account for their revenues and assets (Dunya News, 2017).

The NAB has been ordered by the court to investigate allegations of corruption made against Nawaz Sharif, his three children and son-in-law. As a result, Nawaz Sharif was no longer eligible to serve in public office (Dunya News, 2017). The NAB filed three proceedings against the former prime minister in accordance with the order of the highest court. Accordingly, they pertained to the Al-



Azizia Steel Mill, the offshore company Flagship Investment, and the Avenfield Apartments in London (Abbtakk, 2018).

The court sentenced Nawaz Sharif to 10 years in prison in the Avenfield case on July 6, 2018. His daughter, Maryum Nawaz, and his son-in-law, Captain Safdar, were also sentenced to seven and one years in jail, respectively (BBC, 2018, Dawn, 2018). Nawaz Sharif and his family filed an appeal with the Islamabad High Court against the verdict. The Islamabad High Court reversed the decision in September 2018 because the NAB "was not able to substantiate a financial relationship between the former prime minister and the flats in question, according to the Islamabad high court Judge, Athar Minallah. Due to a lack of evidence, Nawaz Sharif was declared not guilty in the Flagship Investment case on December 24th, 2018. But in the Al-Azizia Steel Mill case, he was sentenced to 7 years in prison and a Rs.1.5 billion and US\$ 25 million fine (Dawn,2018) (Tribune,2018).

According to some commentators, Nawaz Sharif's October impeachment was only a cover for the catastrophic Dawn Leaks scandal. The episode not only affected the period's comparatively robust civil-military ties, but also the military's domestic and international prestige, embarrassing the army. After the Dawn Leaks scandal, the military began speaking on national political and legal issues. Nawaz Sharif has openly criticized his disqualification as an attempt to topple his elected administration ever since he was removed from office. His criticism of the military, which PML-N supporters think organized Nawaz Sharif's removal through the court, has been less direct up until this ruling, in contrast to his rather clear criticism of the Supreme Court.

6. The Emergence of Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan

The Tehreek.e.Labbaik Pakistan staged their first demonstration in 2017 and marched toward Islamabad in response to changes made to the country's election laws (Ahmed, 2022). Three weeks into the sit-in, the law minister resigned. Later, the TLP leaders signed a deal with high-ranking Pakistan Muslim League-N officials and a security agency representative. The government finally gave in to the demands of the protesters who had been camped out at the Faizabad Interchange after the weeks-long demonstration that almost brought the nation's capital to a stop and resulted in the lives of many people. Zahid Hamid stepped down as Federal law minister. Once the administration agreed to comply with every demand they had made, the protest leaders called an end to their sit-ins. In cities around the nation, these sit-ins have disrupted daily life (Dawn, 2017). After a devastating operation against protestors in Faizabad, followed by "successful negotiations" with the protest organizers, the minister chose to quit. Before the operation was finally halted, six people were killed and hundreds more were injured. According to a letter circulated among media and signed by protest leaders as well as Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal, among others, the government has agreed to the Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLY) demands in order to halt the sit-in (Rava,2017) (Dawn,2017). The government's decision to give in to the demands of the Islamist organization has drawn criticism from some quarters, who claim that it would lead to a rise in radicalization nationwide. Critics also voiced their displeasure with a provision in the



controversial agreement that praised Pakistan's army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, and his staff for their "exceptional efforts" during the discussions. The disputed passage was there in the paper.

The demonstrators began to disperse after the agreement was struck, and a video that rapidly went viral on social media showed a senior military official distributing Rs 1,000 to each departing protester so that they may return to their respective home cities (Khan, 2017). Even while the TLP was unsuccessful to destabilize Sharif's government, it was able to inflict severe damage on his authority. This indicated that the TLP was now a formidable opponent, especially if the country's powerful establishment wanted to use it for its own ends. Even though the TLP was unable to destabilize Sharif's government, it was able to deal him a blow that considerably weakened his grip on power.

The rise of the TLP and its days-long agitations in Islamabad, along with the widely circulated videos showing men in uniform paying off protesters, were seen by the PML-N and its leaders as proof that this group was being supported by the establishment as part of a larger effort to prevent the PML-N from regaining power in the 2018 elections. Both the military and the TLP refuted this claim.

7. The Emergence of Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM)

The Mehsud Tahafuz Movement (MTM), which is where the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) got its start, was established in 2014 by eight Mehsud students at Gomal University as an effort to clear Waziristan of landmines and advocate for the rights of the Mehsud population affected by military operations. The goal of the MTM was to clear Waziristan of landmines (Jafri, 2021). Naqibullah Mehsud was a young businessman and aspiring model from Karachi who was killed in an extrajudicial assassination in 2018 (Ahmed, 2018). This event sparked an outcry that extended throughout Pakistan in 2018. After Naqibullah Mehsud was killed, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) was established in order to seek justice for him. The group also expressed its discontent with associating Taliban's with the Pashtun people.

Later, the PTM expanded its goals to include the Pashtun people, Pakistan's second-largest ethnic group, in its representation. Due to its recent quick expansion, the PTM has become a significant movement. Though people from many various ethnic groups and geographical areas support the movement, the majority of this support is concentrated in northern Balochistan and areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Instead of looking backward and focusing on a tribal past, the PTM seeks to advance a new political narrative of the Pashtuns. Some of the PTM's principal objectives were the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and the "mainstreaming" of the FATA. The PTM asks that the Pashtuns have constitutional and security rights in this state. The PTM's establishment is a sign of the Pashtun youth's commitment to combat radicalism. By reviving a true youth-led progressive



and democratic politics that has been brewing in the Pashtun area for the past 20 years, the movement has also contributed to the formation of a new politics of belonging and resistance. Both the elected governments in Islamabad and Peshawar are receptive to the PTM's demands. In truth, the past administrations made an attempt to integrate Pashtun youth into society. The PPP and PML-N government had a concerted policy to integrate the tribal areas, which included renaming the province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and merging tribal territories with the province. It is somewhat ironic that Pakistan's democratically elected provincial and federal administrations do not adhere to the same worldview as Pakistan's influential establishment. The effectiveness of the debate with PTM will be directly proportional to the government's capacity to exert influence over the powerful establishment.

Conclusion

We found that adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence, argued by Samuel P. Huntington, during the elected regimes of PMLN (2013-2018) could not be brought and maintained due to various factors highlighted in the . The supremacy of civilians during the elected regimes of Pakistan Muslim League-N (2013-2018) could not be established due to the below facts. Internal and external factors impeded the supremacy of civilians over the armed forces during the PMLN government. Similarly, Dawn Leaks, Panama Papers, Zahid Himd religious affairs minister removal, national action plan, Musharraf trial, Imran Khan sit-ins, the emergence of Tahreek e Labbaik, Model town Lahore incident, the emergence of Pashtoon tahafuz Movement etc have been the main factors that weakened the elected government of PMLN to ensure its supremacy over the army.

Again, both the elected regimes had to face stern challenges from the military in areas where the elected governments tried to assert their influence. On the other hand, the men in uniform successfully influenced and manipulated the elected government in their own favors. We will not be able to argue that one government was comparatively successful while the other did not in order to maintain their autonomy and independence in legislation and execution. In other words, both the elected governments of PPP and PMLN faced challenges while bringing their autonomy over the armed forces in Pakistan. Though the parties in government, majority and opposition, had been successful in bringing 18th amendment which had of course reduced the direct intervention of Pakistani military, however, the credit goes to Pakistan People Party that remained the main architect of 18th amendment. In comparison, PMLN could not take steps in its regime to counter the influence of the military. Above all, the elected regimes of Pakistan Peoples' Party during 2008-2013 and Pakistan Muslim League-N during 2013-2018 had remained helpless to introduce and maintain autonomy and supremacy over the unelected institutions especially the military.



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