



CONSTRUCTIVISM IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE FROM REALISM

Tariq Anwar Khan

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Hazara University

Mansehra - Pakistan

tariqanwar84@gmail.com

Muhammad Imran Mehsud

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Hazara University

Mansehra - Pakistan

muhammadimran@hu.edu.pk

Dr. Azam Jan

Department of Communication & Media Studies

Hazara University

Mansehra - Pakistan

azamjan@hu.edu.pk

Abstract

India-Pakistan relations have been tried to be explained through constructivist perspectives. It is common fact that ideological and identity differences resulted in the division of Indo-Pak subcontinent in 1947. The Two Nation Theory is put forward as the main factor responsible for the division of India. The post-independence international relationship between the two regional giants is also explained through constructivist perspective. It is argued that the ideational differences of ideology and identity between the two nations are so wide that cooperative relations cannot ensue between them. However, this paper considers material interest or power politics as not only responsible for the division of India but that post-independence rancor owes much to the material aspect of India-Pakistan relations. In a word, this



paper is a critique of pure constructivist approach to India-Pakistan relations and instead, presents (neo) realist approach in explaining India-Pakistan historical and present animosity.

Key Words: Constructivism, Identity, Ideology, Interest, India, (neo) realism, Pakistan, Power.

Introduction

Constructivism or Social Constructivism as an important theoretical tradition of the discipline of International Relations (IR) focuses on the ideational or non-material aspects of international relations. It takes the identities and interests of states as “discursively structured by inter subjective rules, norm and institutions” (Reus & Smith, 2002). Constructivism believes that normative or ideational structures including ideas, ideology, norms, history, culture and identities are also important in shaping international politics as are important the material ones. The advocates of this school of thought argue that “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendth, 1995 as cited in Burchill et al., 2005). As such, material resources have no meaning unless human perceptions add meanings and values to it. The meaning and values thus guide human behavior. “Human actions” this school maintains “are inspired not by material interests ‘per se’ but by perceptions of them” and that material forces like power and wealth have no “intrinsic value independent of human perceptions and cognition” (Luca, 2006).

Given that, the identities and interests of political actors, including states, are not pre-determined but are formed and shaped by social interactions. It implies that human perceptions and social interactions constructs what we see in the world. A neighbor state is a state which becomes an enemy or a friend after human perceptions assign such a value and identity to the state. Similarly, the anarchic nature of the international political system is “what states make of it” (Mustafa, 2007). “An anarchy of friends” as Alexander Went continued “differs from one of enemies, one of self-help from one of collective security, and these are all constituted by structures of shared knowledge” (Sorpong, 2002). Thus, the world around us, in the words of Nicholas Onuf, is a “world of our making.” It also implies that states’ interests and the behavior and actions to achieve these interests are also structured by perceptions and identities of states (Wendth, 1995 as cited in Burchill, et al., 2005).

Therefore, the understanding of the identity formation is imperative in understanding international politics. Similarly, according to constructivism, actors and structures are



mutually constituted. As Wendt states, it “is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests” (Wendt, 1995 as cited in Burchill, et al., 2005). In this sense, unlike realism which focuses on the strategic questions of how states pursue or satisfy their interests, constructivism focuses on the origin of preferences and interests and how actors choose their interests.

Constructivism has three different forms; systemic constructivism, unit-level constructivism and holistic constructivism. Systemic constructivism stresses on inter-state interactions and its influence on states’ identities and interests. Such an “outside-in” approach is represented by Wendt who stresses on the social identity of the state referring to the status, role or personality that international society ascribes to a state. Systemic constructivism ignores the corporate identity which refers to the human, material, ideological, or cultural factors within a state that make a state what it is. Unit-level constructivism focuses on these internal determinants of the identities and interests of states. Holistic constructivism takes into account all the determinants on both international and state level of analysis (Wendt, 1995 as cited in Burchill, et al., 2005). This paper offers a critique of the application of constructivism in India-Pakistan relations from the perspective of realism. It is divided into two major sections. Section one deals with the application of constructivism in India-Pakistan relations whereas, section two incorporates the critique of the relevancy and application of constructivism to India-Pakistan relations from the perspective of realism.

Constructivism in India-Pakistan Relations

In order to fully comprehend India-Pakistan relations, the constructivist perspective demands to take into account the ideational or non-material aspect of the relations. For that purpose, the holistic constructivist approach needs to be adopted which shall begin with identifying the ideational structures operating at both unit and systemic levels. Similarly, as Alexander Wendt claims that, “History matters” the contemporary India-Pakistan identities, interests, strategic rationale, and actions and behaviors are not pre-social but post-social, therefore deeply rooted in the ideology, history and socialization of the pre-partition history of India and Pakistan (Sorpong, P. 2002).

The unit level constructivism is historically favored by a political party, All India Muslim League (AIML) and stressed by majority of the leaders and intellectuals from Pakistan in order to justify the creation of Pakistan. It states that the ideational structures of religious and cultural differences, socialization and differing ideological orientations, played effective roles in the formation of “separate Muslim identity”. Seen through unit level



constructivist lenses, the partition of India was a consequence of clash of identities. It argues that the ideational and normative structures of culture, religion and historical socialization shaped the pre-partition identities, and subsequent interests, strategic rationale and actions and behaviors. It happened through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint.

All India Muslim League (AIML) representing the “separate Muslim identity” initially imagined the possibility of co-existence with the Hindu majority in united India. It became the core interest of the then times. The possible working strategy thought was enough constitutional safeguards for the preservation of Muslim identity under united India. Quaid-i-Azam’s demands for constitutional safeguards, envisaged in Lucknow Pact of 1916, and his “Fourteen Points” augment this argument. During those times, separatism was not yet imagined as is obvious from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s “Hindustan is a bride with Muslim and Hindus its two lustrous eyes” and Dr. Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s famous poem of “of all the worlds, is ours Hindustan the beautiful most”. Yet they struggled for constitutional security of their rights, culture and identity.

The Muslim leaders communicated and justified their behavior through justifying the threats to their “separate identity”. Quaid-i-Azam repeatedly projected this separate identity as could be seen in one of his speeches. Thirdly, the separate identity of Muslim constrained the behavior of the leadership of AIML to acquiesce to Indian National Congress (INC) projected ideas, ideology and identity. Equally constrained was the leadership strategic rationale and behavior of going to the other extreme of complete separation and separate homeland due to its identity till 1940 (Raviprasad, 2010).

At the same time, another identity was also popping up and getting its final shape. After living together for thousand years, there were enough ideational elements like cultural affinities, religious tolerance and diversity and joint socialization that resulted in the formation of a “united secular Indian identity” as well. INC was the forerunner of such an identity. Till 1940, INC imagined the existence of a predominant “united Indian identity” with no need of making constitutional concessions to assure for the existential fears of the separate Muslim identity (Sridharan, 2005). Such a failure could be seen in Nehru report of 1929 and the INC government of 1937-1939. The preponderance and intactness of the Indian identity was communicated by Gandhi and Nehru at different occasions. Gandhi once referred to Hindustan as “a sacred cow”. This “united Indian secular multi-ethnic identity” restrained the behavior of the leadership of INC from assuaging Muslims fears of threats to their rights, culture, religion, civilization and identities.



With the march of time and further socialization and interactions, the two identities further shaped, hardened and sharpened and evolved along with the evolution in interests and actions through the discussed mechanisms. It was realized that, like two rivers “which meandered close to each other here and there, but on the whole the two have flowed their separate courses”. AIML imagined of the identity of the Muslims as a separate nation, its interest in having a separate homeland and strategy and behavior of independence from the British and separation from Hindu majority through constitutional means. Jinnah claimed that India was a “geographical unity and not political.” The same was *communicated* and appealed through the “Two Nation Theory” and the behaviors *restrained* from going with the status quo or complying with the INC demands (Raviprasad, 2010).

Indian National Congress imagined of its intact same identity, communicated the “secular united Indian” viewpoint for legitimizing the same and restrained their behavior from accepting the new demand, the state of Pakistan.

The system level constructivism is historically favored by INC and the leadership and intellectuals from post-independence India to justify the hollowness and shallowness of the two nation theory and illegal partition of India. Applying the outside-in approach of the systemic constructivism, the external determinants shaping the two identities could be identified with the British colonial policies. Since India remained a part of the British Empire till 1947, therefore any influence from the British government cannot be technically termed as external, yet it was systemic and external in its influences.

On the one hand, the British advent into the subcontinent created political unity in the disperse kingdom thereby changing the collective identity. On the other hand, the British advent created clashing identities as well. It is argued that before the advent of the British, the intrinsic identity of the people of India was that of united Indian secular national identity. Such an identity was an amalgamation of the two civilizations and is seen in the Indian way of living, arts, architecture, languages, dance, music and painting (Varma, 1987 as cited in Gautam, 2013). This collective Indian identity was one of mutual peace, unity and harmony. Such a unity was a threat to the British colonial interests.

Therefore, it was prudent to employ the policy of divide and rule and sow seeds of mutual differences in terms of languages, religions, cultures and civilizations, economic classes, ethnicity, caste and creed. Such a policy was successful in bringing and highlighting different cleavages to fore. However, the divisions projected on the basis of religion worked wonder due to the conservative nature of the Indian society. Specifically,



Muslims and Hindus were identified as the main instrument of their policy of divide and rule. It was clear to them that the two communities constitute the backbone of the Indian society; both are different to one another particularly in terms of history, culture and religion and that both are too sensitive to religion.

Such vulnerabilities provided the British government with an opportunity to whip up their mutual cleavages. Ultimately two separate; Muslim identity and Hindu identity were created. By extending the same structural constructivist argument down the road of history, it can be concluded that the popping up of the “two nation theory”, and the consequent separatist tendencies and behaviors and the ultimate division of India was a consequence of the British policy of divide and rule. This way the imagination, communication and the restraint mechanisms being applied to shape the identity, interests and actions of the two communities was a British inspiration to prolong its colonial rule.

Whether these differing identities were social or corporate is a debate that falls outside the jurisdiction of this paper, however according to the constructivist logic, India was divided into India and Pakistan in 1947 as a result of the clash of identities.

After partition and the creation of two separate nations, the Indian and Pakistani identities were further hardened at two levels of constructivism; unit “self perception” level and systemic “the other perceptions” level. At unit level, India imagined and perceived herself a great secular, inclusive, multiethnic, multi-religious, culturally diverse, and a model and beacon of democracy in the third world (Rahul, 2009). “As a counter pose in India, the initial decades of Nehruvian secularism gave way to new political forces. The “saffron agenda” of Hindu fundamentalists to look at the state as an expression of religious identity was an experiment that gained momentum in the last two decades of the last century with the political success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Its spiritual mentors, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parshad (VHP) were right-wing organizations that sought to replace the secular space created by the Congress since independence with a program that appealed to the “religious consciousness” of the Hindu majority (Raviprasad, (2010).

At systemic level, India perceived the creation of Pakistan as unjustified and accepted the two nation theory for the time being. The division of India is considered arbitrary and that the division in itself is responsible for generating negative perceptions between India and Pakistan. It was argued that India accepted the Two-Nation theory in order to keep the British happy and expedite their departure. Nehru in a speech at Madras in 1957 said “We have never accepted Pakistan and we do not propose to accept the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was founded.” Not only does the Indian side fails to accept the creation of Pakistan, but they occasionally have operationalized such wishes by



orchestrating the debacle of east Pakistan in 1971, interfering in Baluchistan, Karachi, FATA and KP (Ganguly, 1994 as cited in Gautam, 2013).

Similarly, India perceives herself as the inheritor of British raj and adopts most of the British strategic ideas thereby considering its contiguous territories as its legitimate security sphere and therefore frame security policy in terms of whole subcontinent (Bhumitra, 2009). Such a self-perception and identity had implications for the other perception. India perceived the other regional states as under her sphere of influence and such perception resulted in Indian interest of preventing the region from falling into other hands. Such a perception was operationalized at different occasions when India intervened in Sri Lanka in 1983, in Bangladesh's Chittagong hill track and Nepal in 1991. Quiet in line with such a perception, some of the regional powers like Bhutan and Maldives have been reduced into vessel or satellite states and Sikkim federated with the Indian union in 1975. Such a sub-continental policy has implications for Pakistan as well. Similarly, at unit level Pakistan perceives her as an "Islamic state" that came into being on the basis of the two nation theory (Rahul, 2009). This theory states that the differences between Hindus and Muslims are huge enough that they can't live together in a single state. For Jinnah, to quote Akbar S. Ahmed, "Pakistan meant more than just territory, more than a defined area with boundaries; Pakistan meant a culmination of a Muslim movement rooted in history, the quest for a mystical homeland, a Pakistan, a land of the pure" (Rizvi, 1986 as cited in Gautam, 2013). Such an identity was strengthened further by Islamisation efforts. This continued Islamisation of Pakistan's polity has ensured the total absence of "strong and legitimate centers of moderation and modernity" in a country that is still ruled by a feudal oligarchy.

At systemic level, Pakistan perceives Indian sub-continental level policy as hegemonic at minimum or to undo Pakistan under Akhand Bharat (undivided India) at maximum. Pakistan is still obsessed with the existential anxiety and believes that India will forego no opportunity to undo Pakistan, had the latter been found unguarded. A former Pakistani ambassador to India summarizes such a perception as: "We perceive that the Indian leadership and a sizeable segment of its following continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as a historical error forced on India, that given the opportunity, they would like in some way to redress the situation" (Bhumitra, 2009).

Constructivists argue that a state based on one identity has potential for conflict with state based on a different identity. As per this argument, India and Pakistan with differing self and other perceptions are bound to fight one another. Constructivists also claim that the pre-partition war of ideas and identities between INC and AIML is still influencing India Pakistan relations. Accordingly, India's secular identity is poised to eat into the core of



the two nation theory by wrenching Kashmir and helping other sub- nationalistic entities in Pakistan whereas Pakistan Islamic nationalism is bracing for wrenching Kashmir (Sridharan, 2005). According to Sumit Ganguly, the three major factors that makes India-Pakistan conflict enduring are; the hasty exit of the British, Indian and Pakistani leaders' ideological commitments and the irredentist issue of Kashmir.

While accounting for different aspects of war and peace, mutual proxy wars of interventions and interferences constructivists rely on the ideational side of India-Pakistan. Since inception, India-Pakistan relations are marked by three major wars of 1948, 1965, 1971 and a half Kargil war of 1999. The main bone of contention of the wars of 1948, 1965 and 1999 remained Kashmir. They also have engaged one another in proxy wars and low intensity level conflicts. Pakistan's support to different groups in the Indian administered Kashmir and Indian support to different groups in the erstwhile East Pakistan are the epitomes of such policies. The war of 1971 was such an extension of the Indian policy in East Pakistan. Both the nations are also involved in modernizing their armed forces. They have also undergone nuclear in May 1998. At the same time, efforts have also been made to establish peace between the two regional giants. However, these efforts proved elusive. Presently, both the nations are allegedly involved in interfering in one another internal affairs.

The wars of 1948, 1965 and Kargil war of 1999 are explained in terms of ideas, ideologies and identity at unit constructivism level. The issue of Kashmir is at the back of these wars and which is an issue of identities and ideologies. Pakistan wants to federate Kashmir so as to strengthen the two nation theory and legitimize its claim as a Muslim state. India on the contrary is striving to wrench Kashmir so as to legitimize its claim as a secular multi-ethnic state and downplay the two nation theory. Therefore the issue of Kashmir is an issue of identities, ideologies and nation building. Different strategies adopted by Pakistan, India and Kashmiris are also predominantly based on identity and ideology (Rahul, 2009).

Pakistan initial strategy was to get the 1949 UN's resolution implemented and its second strategy became that of appealing to the Islamic ideology and identity of Kashmiris. After the failure of her legalistic strategy Pakistan resorted to helping the Islamists to wage jihad against the infidel India which resulted in the strengthening of the ideological dimensions of Kashmir after 1989 intifada. India on the other hand is attracting the secular identity of the valley, trying to quell Kashmiris nationalism and outdo Islamic identity. Kashmiris are appealing to the local identity of Kashmiriyat so as to get it strengthened and ultimately win independence of the two nations (Rahul, 2009).



Sub-regional identities of Ladakhis, Jammuites, and residents of the Kashmir Valley also play an important role in the internal and external politics of Kashmir. Some researchers in the field also consider a strong constructivist dimension to the dispute of Kashmir by highlighting the influence of history and state-making processes as a source of conflict respectively (Sridharan, 2005). Pakistan still believes that the partition and its Islamic identity will complete with the cessation of Kashmir to Pakistan. In the wars of 1948, 1965 and 1999, this quest for identity and ideological consideration in Kashmir played the major role.

The war of 1971 which was fought due to East Pakistan crises has also a strong ideational dimension. Bengalis wished to have a separate homeland for identity reasons. Their fear of identity assimilation and desire for maintaining their distinct linguistic and nationalistic identity compelled them to struggle for independence. Pakistani military tried to smash the movement so vehemently for identity and ideological reasons. Longing for a separate homeland on the basis of territorial or linguistic or ethnic nationalism was a fatal blow for the two nation theory.

The Two-Nation theory stipulates that Hindus and Muslim are two separate nations which cannot coexist in a single political entity. The secular united Indian ideology contended the said theory. In order to make the Islamic ideological and two nation theory base of Pakistan hollow from inside, India started supporting *makhtibahni*. Such ideological and identity clashes of the two nation theory, the Bengali nationalism and Indian efforts to prove the former ideology an illusion resulted in the war of 1971. When war was concluded with the defeat of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation, the then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, announced that, “the two nation theory has been thrown into the Bay of Bengal”. After 1971, Pakistan’s sensitivity to its identity and its Islamic ideological base increased (Rahul, 2009).

Currently, India and Pakistan are leveling serious allegations against one another of mutual interfering and interventions. Pakistan accuses India of interference and terrorism in the provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP), and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) whereas India accuses Pakistan of interferences in major cities of India and other group in northern India, Khalistan and Nexalites. Pakistan considers such Indian involvements as Indian designs of repeating the East Pakistan debacle and weakening the Two-Nation theory. For Pakistan, Indian presence in Afghanistan is to nudge the Baluch nationalism and budge Afghanistan irredentism across the Durand line so that Pakistan’s ideological footing could be worn out. Same argument is given in the cases of KP and FATA. Similar ideational are the apprehensions of the Indian side. The Pakistani involvement in igniting Islamic militancy in Indian



administered Kashmir, support to Nexalites and Khalistan and dissident groups in northern India is considered to bleed India white and bruise her secular united multi-ethnic identity.

To constructivists, the nuclear weapons race in south Asia has also an ideological and identity aspect. The Indian nuclear program is primarily considered a status and identity driven instead of security driven one. Because by 1998 China was no more a threat and Pakistan's nuclear program followed the Indian one suit. India perceives herself of a great power, and such a desire for greatness pushed India towards acquiring nuclear weapons. On the contrary, Pakistan's nuclear program was primarily retaliatory and security oriented one, though; it also had a strong ideational dimension. By the dint of nuclear deterrence, Pakistan is secure against Indian threats to her identity. Similarly, the "Islamic atom bomb" gave Pakistan leadership in the Muslim Ummah which is a matter of honor and prestige.

At systemic constructivism level, different systemic factors have implications for the identity of India and Pakistan. According to constructivists, institutions being constitutive shape states identities. In relation to international institutions, constructivism believes that states identities and behaviour are shaped considerably by international institutions (Amitav, 2007). India-Pakistan enduring rivalry is explained by global identity and ideological determinants. This can include the cold war ideological divide of socialism and capitalism and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

During the pre-partition India, INC and AIML identities and ideological orientations differed considerably in their disposition towards socialism and capitalism. INC being a party of mostly common people, possessing a strong anti-colonial posture along with close relations with the socialist party of Soviet Union had socialist leanings. On the contrary, AIML being predominantly a party of feudal lords had capitalist inclinations. After partition, such inclination became crystal clear in the foreign policy of Pakistan when she joined the western bloc in its fight against communism and joined SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1956 respectively. The western capitalist bloc and these security organizations threshed a pro-western and an anti-communist identity upon Pakistan.

On the contrary, the Indian strategic culture exhibiting the Gandhian moral philosophy and Nehruvian principles of independence, self reliance and non-alignment and the systemic incentives of joining the NAM gave the Indian identity an independent and non-aligned outlook. Such an outlook albeit remained superficial as India under the dominance of socialistic INC was lured into the communist orbit though not as vehemently and visible as Pakistan (David, 2014). Owing to its anti-communist identity,



Pakistan acted as the regional bully of the capitalist bloc and container of communism in the region. India too tried to act on the side of socialist bloc to offset the Pakistan led western influence. Consequently, Indo-Pak grievances grew due to the socialistic and capitalistic ideologically ingrained impressions upon the identities and the subsequent acting as proxies for the cold warriors by the two regional powers.

Similarly, in SAARC, incremental socialization to create collective norms and identity fall prey to regional power politics. Neo liberal institutionalism can explain the failure of an institution fails due to lack of incentives and constructivism explains the sustenance of an international institution despite lack of incentives. SAARC has failed in shoving an identity upon its regional members as is being done by EU or ASEAN. In fact, local identities are so much strong and negative that SAARC unlike ASEAN Way failed to develop the SAARC Way. The local differences in identities are so much opposite that any efforts for collective norms or identity is soon overtaken by the former ones.

Pakistan and India have tried to resolve their mutual disputes and many such proposals have been put forward from both the sides. However, all these attempts proved futile due to the fact that the efforts failed to consider the ideational side of the disputes. Constructivists argue that unless and until mutual perceptions, ideological, identity and cultural differences are diluted, peace will elude the India-Pakistan relations.

A Critique of Realism

According to realism, states project their interests in terms of identity, ideology or religion yet their ultimate objective is to acquire power. Kashmir is neither an issue of ideology or identity nor of religion. Garnering Kashmir would neither strengthen Islamic identity of Pakistan or the secular one of India nor would its loss lessen the same. Instead the factor that makes Kashmir dear to both the nations is the sensitivity of both the states to cumulative relative gain value of the territory. Kashmir is a huge piece of territory with immense strategic and economic importance. It is located at the cross road of four important sub regional systems of Asia. Its border are touched by China from the far east region, Afghanistan from south west Asia, India and Pakistan from south Asia and Turkmenistan from central Asia separated by the 22 km wide strip of Wakhan. Its location at high altitude as compared to the rest of the plains of Indo-Pak subcontinent has serious implications for the security of the surrounding states particularly Pakistan, India and china. The territory is of particular importance to the security of Pakistan and India. If India gets Kashmir then Pakistan will become strategically very vulnerable to India in two aspects. First, the high altitude location of Kashmir will make the general territory of Pakistan and Islamabad in particular quiet pregnable. Second, Federally



Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and the provinces of Gilgit Bultistan (GB), KP and the Punjab becomes directly exposed to Indian threat and Pakistan's "strategic clutch" squeezed further thereby intensifying Pakistan's quest for stretched strategic depth.

The economic importance of the region in terms of its timber, tourist industry, local wool industry or minerals might be not huge enough to have implications for the relative gain value of both the states. However, its hydro resource is a resource that has both economic and strategic cumulative relative gain value. The economies of both India and Pakistan are agrarian. Pakistan is mostly dependent on the waters from Kashmir for its agriculture and hydel generation to cover for power deficit of 7000 MW. India is also highly dependent on these waters. Particularly, the states of Rajashta, Punjab and Haryana which are the breadbasket of India are fed by the rivers of Kashmir. In hydel generation, Kashmir has the potential to generate easy and cheap electricity. In such a case Pakistan's dependency being measured in ratios is the highest in the world. India by comparison has other river systems like Ganges, Meghna and Barak which provides for its water resources. Moreover, these waters have strategic importance as well. Indian damming of the rivers flowing into Pakistan could be used as a weapon against Pakistan by opening the gates of some 67 Indian dams built in the Indian administered Kashmir upstream and flooding the terrain of Pakistan. The dams can also hold water and thereby rendering the traditional defense canals of Sialkot and Lahore useless against a land invasion. Since most of the rivers flowing into Pakistan either originate or come across the Indian administered Kashmir therefore it is the strategic and hydrological factor instead of identity or ideological one which makes Kashmir the spring of power. The gain of Kashmir will be having immense cumulative relative gain value both in terms of fungibility of power and its strategic and military gain value. Its fall into the Indian side or Pakistani side of the balance will have serious ramifications for the politics of balance of power between the two nations. Similarly, if Pakistan gets Kashmir, it could amend to some extent for the loss of the balance of the debacle of East Pakistan.

Similarly, the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was the result of Indian policy of regional hegemony. India, following the logic of offensive realist logic tried to increase its relative power as compared to other powers. Pakistan in particular was the power in position to challenge Indian regional hegemony. To reduce the balancing power of Pakistan and establish regional hegemony, the 1000 miles geographical divide between east and West Pakistan, relative deprivation of the Bengalis and emergence of such a feeling at popular level were enough opportunities for India to cut the eastern wing off the western wing of the country. India intervened at the right moment and succeeded in its objectives.



Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan is to correct Indian imbalance of power by searching strategic depth against India. Indian policy in Afghanistan is to offset Pakistan quest for balancing India and further attenuate Pakistan's power by helping the afghan government in its irredentist claims against Pakistan.

Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to balance the conventionally superior India. India, though projected security as the major factors, did it for the sake of partisan politics, status and prestige. China was mentioned to be the threat in this regard however; their missile's technology orientation is more toward Pakistan. It also created a de facto deterrence between the two nations. The localized nature of Kargil and peaceful diffusion of 2002 military standoff are cited as examples of such deterrence.

For realists, cold war was not an ideological feud. It was a war for power and influence. This war for power and influence was there between the capitalist czarist Russia and Great Britain during the great game. Socialist China aligned with USA against socialist USSR during cold war. Democratic India inclined towards totalitarian USSR and totalitarian Pakistan aligned with democratic USA during the cold war. These all show that ideology was a pretext in the cold war. Similarly, the security organizations of SEATO and CENTO being formed did not impart any ideological flour to its participants. Even the cold war participants had their own reasons of security, power and influence. Pakistan did not adopt an anti-socialist policy due to ideological or identity factors but due to material interests. Pakistan needed external balancing in the formative phase and hereafter in order to balance India and ensure her survival.

Apparently realism fails to explain the establishment of SAARC as it was established in the absence of a hegemon and in the absence of an external threat. However, realists believe that international institutions acts as instrument of power influence. According to this logic, the smaller states used SAARC as a shield against Indian regional hegemony. In other words, SAARC was established by smaller states to refine the edges of the balance of power. Similarly, its sluggish performance can be explained by realism as it falls prey to the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Moreover, lack of a hegemon and a common threat perception further augment the realist argument.



References

- Amitav A. (September 2007). Draft Paper for the Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System” George Washington University.
- Bhumitra, C. (2009). South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30(3), 395-420, DOI: 10.1080/13523260903326404
- Burchill, S. et al., (2005). *Theories of International Relations*. (3rd ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 196.
- David, W. K. J. (2014). Toward Alliance or Ambivalence: A Theoretical Assessment of U.S-India Relations, *India Review*, 13(2), 129-148, DOI: 10.1080/14736489.2014.904153.
- Gautam, W. (2013). The Common Futures of India and Pakistan: A New Approach to Independent Futurist India. *Journal of Futures Studies*, 18(2): 83-102
- Luca, R. (2006). “Post-cold war Nato and international relations theory: The case for neo-classical realism,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4(1), 86-87.
- Mustafa, D. (2007). Social Construction of Hydropolitics: The Geographical Scales of Water and Security in the Indus Basin. *The Geographical Review*, 97 (4), 484-501.
- Rahul, R. C. (2009). INDIA VERSUS PAKISTAN. *The RUSI Journal*, 154:4, 60-65, DOI: 10.1080/03071840903216486.
- Raviprasad, N. (2010). The India-Pakistan Dyad: A Challenge to the Rest Or To Themselves?, *Asian Perspective*, 34 (4), 165-190.
- Reus & Smith, C. (2002). Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School. *British Journal of Politics and International Relation*, 4(3), 487-509.
- Sorpong, P. (2002). Realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian security studies today: a review essay, *The Pacific Review*, 15(1), 119-138, DOI: 10.1080/09512740110110882.
-



Sridharan, E. (2005). International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict. *India Review*, 4:2, 103-124, DOI: 10.1080/14736480500225582

Sridharan, E. (2005). Introduction: South Asia and Theories of Nuclear Deterrence: Sub-continental Perspectives. *India Review*, 4(2), 99-102, DOI:10.1080/14736480500265299.