



INDO-PAK RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF MUMBAI ATTACKS

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Abstract

Mumbai, India, is easily accessible from Pakistan across the Arabian Sea. Many business people and visitors from other countries also make the city their home base. South Mumbai was in disarray on the morning of November 27th, 2008, after several people had been killed and hundreds injured in a series of coordinated strikes the day before. During the night, an attack was made against the exclusive society and the foreigners living among them. The deadly act severely undermined the ongoing attempts to improve relations between India and Pakistan. The Indian government spoke out against Pakistan's terror plans and painted Islamabad as the country's nerve core. The Indian government has said that Lashkar-e-Tayba is responsible for the attacks on Indian citizens. The trust deficit between the two states, brought up by the violent approach, is often seen as the most pressing issue currently afflicting ties between India and Pakistan.

Keywords: Pakistan, India, Mumbai, Terror, Lashkar – e- Tayba,

Introduction

India and Pakistan's disagreements are complex. The status of Muslim-majority Kashmir is emblematic of the larger issue over the character of the two nations. Even though India's Muslim population has grown to overtake Pakistan's, the two nations have been at odds



about who should claim Kashmir since independence. On the opposite end of the scale are other minor disputes, some of which date back to 1947 and the partition of the Indian Subcontinent. While workable remedies exist for some of these issues, widespread mistrust prevents their implementation. Because of this mistrust, many opportunities are lost, and important business links are not formed. Increased ties between India and Pakistan seem like they would benefit both countries economically, and this might help strengthen the friendship between India and Pakistan. However, in recent years, there has been a movement in the dominant perception in Delhi towards Pakistan, toward an understanding of the threats India faces from an unstable Pakistan. (John & Chakrabarti, 2009) There is a fundamental gulf in understanding why India and Pakistan have such a contentious relationship, and this is at the root of the bad narrative that has developed between the two countries.

Pakistan's argument for obtaining independence from India, as the homeland for Muslims in South Asia, has rested in large part on the Kashmir dispute for decades. A period of collaboration may commence if the Kashmir problem is "settled," maybe through the UN referendum required in 1948. India contended that the 1972 Shimla Accord, in which India and Pakistan pledged to observe the Line of Control and address the dispute bilaterally, negated the demand for a plebiscite, which was reliant on Pakistani soldiers leaving from the erstwhile princely state. India has prioritised additional confidence-building activities to strengthen trust between the two parties, producing a more "resolvable" atmosphere for the Kashmir conflict. In recent years, a "composite conversation" has served as the foundation for negotiations on a variety of contentious subjects, including Kashmir. There have been a number of setbacks, the most recent being the terrorist assault on Mumbai in 2008. (Malik, 2019) Between 2004 and 2007, considerable headway was achieved. In particular, it appeared that both nations had settled on the notion of soft boundaries as the basis for any future accord over Kashmir rather than territory swaps. However, other sources of conflict remained unaddressed, and efforts to strengthen commercial ties had stalled even before the Mumbai attacks because of the impasse over Kashmir.

Several new elements have developed since 2008. After the 1993 bombing of the Bombay Stock Exchange and the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, India took a keen interest in the problem of international terrorism. The Mumbai assaults, however, were the last straw for India, and thus Pakistan had to step in. There needed to be some time for public sentiment and partisan tensions to level off after the assaults. Pakistan's economic development has stalled, and the country's relationship with the United States has worsened significantly. While talks started slowly in 2010, a new emphasis on economic relationships opened up in late 2011 thanks in large part to Pakistan's faltering economy. Additionally, there appears to be a growing realisation in India of the benefits that broader



regional commerce would give, as well as an acknowledgement that interaction with Pakistan is necessary for a trade deal covering the whole subcontinent. (John & Chakrabarti, 2009) Pakistan has recently shown more hope for its commercial capacity to compete with India, which is helpful considering the apparent popularity of Pakistani textiles in India.

Relations before Mumbai Attacks

Indo-Pak relations have been strained and rocky since 1947. Independence led to tremendous migration and human bloodbath, boundary and water issues, religious minority concerns, and Jammu and Kashmir's entry to the Indian Union. India became stable faster than Pakistan. India surpassed Pakistan in the constitution, economic rebuilding and dependability. "As mentioned, India was less affected by division than Pakistan. She had more finances, a better-organized political party, and Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership for 17 years. (Burke, 1974) 1948 saw India and Pakistan's first undeclared war over Kashmir. Later, the UN was consulted. Both countries accepted a ceasefire in December 1948. In 1950-51, the situation deteriorated again, and both countries were on the verge of war. Nehru-Liaquat Pact was made in 1950 to protect both states' minorities.

1953-54 was a period of Pak-US relations that offered Pakistan military aid. In February 1954, President Eisenhower indicated that the US would provide such aid. New ramifications and anxieties from surrounding states and areas surfaced. It represented a new era. The Pak-Western alliance skewed and worsened relations with the Arab World and Afghanistan while paralysing Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan never had any real reason to be afraid of the Communist Bloc, but having the United States as an ally has made the Communist Powers hostile. In time, the Soviet Union will side with India over Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. As an insult, Indians often claim that Pakistan let Kashmir slip through their fingers after carelessly alienating India, despite the fact that Pakistan paid a much larger price for its alliance with the United States than it got in return. (Burke, 1974) Nehru saw the Pak-US military alliance as a direct threat, thus he developed Panchsheel, the ideal framework for regulating relations between sovereign nations. It was a response to Eisenhower's 1954 Indo-China proclamation. In 1954-56, India's Prime Minister toured 26 nations and received 41 state leaders for a collective peace process. Sino-Pak ties weren't as murky as Soviet-Pak ones. In 1956, the Pakistani and Chinese premiers shared a cordial environment, and China's attitude toward Kashmir and Pukhtunistan was never against Pakistani goals.

In 1957, the United States began providing economic help to India; according to American policy, India would never be allowed to join the Communist Bloc. The United States'



approach to India has been more fruitful than its stance toward Pakistan. In 1958, relations between China and India began to worsen. China and India's cold war began in 1959, leading to border disputes and a 1962 conflict. "It contributed directly or indirectly to increasing the rift between the Soviet Union and China, cooling ties between Pakistan and the U.S., creating mutual interests between Pakistan and China, and the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971." (Burke, 1974) 1960 also had a favourable influence when opposing republics agreed to share Indus River water. The Sino-Indian border dispute cleared the path for US help to India. The West gave India military aid to fight China, not Pakistan. They pushed Nehru to start Kashmir peace negotiations with Pakistan. 1962-63 were years of intensive Kashmir discussions, but neither side could achieve an agreement. The Kashmir resolution led to more harsh outcomes, while the Rann of Kutch issue led to British participation and settlement in 1965. The dispute was submitted to an international tribunal, which included Alex Beler of Yugoslavia (nominated by India) and Nasrullah Entizm of Iran (nominated by Pakistan). Swedish G. Lagergren chaired the tribunal. On July 4, 1969, the Kutch Agreement was concluded after a court ruling on February 16, 1968, which was found in favour of both parties. Pakistan was allotted 350 square miles, whereas India got 90 per cent. (Khan, 1999) The incidents sparked the 1965 Indo-Pak war. India blamed Pakistan's Azad Kashmir cease-fire violation. Pakistan said India ended Kashmir negotiations. Sheikh Abdullah said Pakistan deployed infiltrators since India shut the door on discussions. (Burke & Ziring, 1990) According to another account, Pakistan lost more than India. Tashkent Declaration was signed on 10 January 1966 between India and Pakistan after the war. The Great Powers intervened because they were worried that the war might extend and draw in more countries, prompting the declaration.

East Pakistan became an independent entity in 1971 owing to West Pakistan's arrogance and unfairness. Indian assistance for Bangladesh caused an Indo-Pak War. On 16 December 1971, The Instrument of Surrender was signed by Pakistan's Eastern Command, thereby ending hostilities. The dissolution of East Pakistan has caused much distress among Pakistanis. It led to Bhutto and Indira's 1972 Simla Accord. The agreement outlined future interactions. It required the two countries to resolve their disagreements through bilateral talks. The deal did not modify the contested area, but it did formalise the 1949 UN "Cease-fire Line" between Pakistan and India as a legal international Line of Control. In 1974, India made history by becoming the region's first nuclear power. The Indian nuclear power undercut Pakistan's defence, forcing Bhutto to say, "We'll fight a thousand years to free Kashmir and eat grass, but we'll create an atomic weapon." 1978 to 1984, both states fought for Kashmir's Siachen Glacier. Siachen is a vital territory for Pakistan and China in northern Pakistan. Through Operation 'Meghdoot,' Indian soldiers conquered the empty and undemarcated Siachen Glacier, seizing about 1,000 square kilometres of land. Since



1984, two armies have fought on the world's highest battleground. (Khan, 1999) Both states struggle to protect the highest border from apprehensions.

In 1990, Indo-Pak ties worsened owing to Kashmiri uprisings, which Pakistan was accused of. The nuclear capacity exacerbated the domestic and political problems. Issue handled with mutual understanding and US intervention. 1992 Hindu-Muslim riots in India froze bilateral relations after the Babri Mosque destruction. Hindu fundamentalists have been rioting since 1853, claiming that Ram's birthplace was erected atop a Hindu temple by Babar in 1527. After a religious event became violent, Hindu and Indian Muslim communities rioted for months, killing at least 2,000 individuals, most of them Muslims. 1993's Bombay bombings led to animosity between the two countries. Indian officials blamed Pakistan, but she denied any involvement. Pakistan carried off five underground nuclear explosions at Chaghi in Baluchistan in response to India's nuclear tests on 11 and 12 May 1998. India ignored Pakistan's desire for discussions on a 'South Asian non-proliferation zone' Talks, in 1999, A.B. Vajpayee and Mohammad Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration. It was a bilateral pact to avert nuclear war and non-conventional and conventional wars. The event increased both countries' confidence and fostered a friendship. Both states' parliaments ratified the pact in the same year.

1999 didn't go as planned. In the months of May and July of 1999, fighting broke out in the Kargil region of Kashmir and along the Line of Control. As a result of a miscalculation on Pakistan's part, Jihadists and regular soldiers backed by the country have taken control of a portion of Indian territory along the Line of Control (LOC), creating a border crisis with significant strategic implications. As stated in (Khalid, 2012, 13) Musharraf made the fatal error of acting on Pakistan's long-held conviction that Indian political leaders were weak and would waver and possibly refuse to react, which contributed to the failure of the Kargil conflict. (Ray, 2011) International pressure prompted Pakistan to depart from the seized territory. The clash harmed Indo-Pak relations and Pakistan's military image. India alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed planned the 2001 Indian Parliament attack. A terrorist attacked New Delhi's Parliament. The attack disrupted Indo-Pak relations by murdering many Indians. After terrorist assaults, India has increased its armed forces and put direct and indirect pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting jihadis and terrorists. (Khalid, 2012, 13) Because of terrorism, India was more careful about how it dealt with Pakistan. Pakistan was linked to the bombings in Mumbai in 2006, the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, and the attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Indian fascists were behind the bombings of the Samjhauta Express in 2007, the Mecca Masjid in 2007, Ajmir Sharief in 2007, and the Malegaon bombing in 2008.

The Mumbai Attacks of 26/11



Seven separate assaults in south Mumbai on November 26, 2008, killed 173 and wounded 293. Initially, the terrorists' identities were unknown, although witnesses said they were under 25 years old. Initially, 25 terrorists were reported, but only 10 were found. Given that the terrorists had no demand and intended to inflict maximum harm, they likely murdered as many individuals as they could before taking secure positions inside. (Teltumbde, 2009) "26/11" is the sole assault that gained media hoopla and was called "India's only attack." Muslim extremists targeted elites and foreigners, hence it's been called the "9/11 of India." (Real Instituto Elcano, 2021) It was the first time affluent facilities, the Taj and the Trident, were attacked rather than normal people; 61 people were slain in these two hotels, including 37 foreigners. The attack on foreigners assured the terrorists' widespread media prominence. In their final report to the court, Mumbai police said, "The assault was painstakingly planned and performed only after extensive, gruelling training, preparation, and briefing." Terrorists wanted to instil fear and panic among Indians and international visitors.

The attack on November 26, 2008, was different in some important ways from the previous attacks that killed a lot of people. First, 158 of the 163 deaths were caused by weapons that could be held in the hand. Explosives were not very important. Second, the terrorists attacked both regular people in public places like a train station, hospital, restaurant, and café, as well as the wealthy social and business elite, both Indians and foreigners, in two of Mumbai's best hotels, the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident, and in a building called Nariman House that was home to a Jewish cultural and religious centre. (Ashraf, 2015) Third, they killed a small number of foreigners: nine Israelis and 12 people from the US and other Western countries who had sent troops to Afghanistan to help the NATO force (the other four were from South-East Asian countries). Fourth, it wasn't a typical case of taking someone hostage. They didn't want to use the hostages to get anything they wanted. Their goal was to fight with the security forces for a long time and get a lot of media attention. Fifth, all 10 of the people who did it were Pakistanis who were trained by the LET in camps on Pakistani soil. Sixth, it was a case of suicide terrorism, just like the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, which was also a suicide attack. In the fight with the police, nine of the terrorists were killed. One was caught alive. His name was Ajmal Amir Kasab. The terrorists were motivated by different things. They wanted to hurt the Indian government's ability to fight terrorism in the eyes of both Indians and people from other countries. They wanted to make foreign business people lose faith in the Indian government's ability to protect their lives and property, which would slow India's rise as a major economic power. (Real Instituto Elcano, 2021) They wanted to hurt Israel and the US because they were getting closer to India. They wanted to get back at the countries in the West that sent troops to Afghanistan to help NATO. The terrorist attack was not caused



by the Kashmir issue or Indian Muslims' complaints against the Indian government, as they were in the two previous cases of mass-casualty terrorism. In those cases, the main reason was the anger of some Indian Muslim youth against the Indian government for different reasons.

The successful terrorist attack caused the government serious political humiliation. It followed four previous significant terrorist attacks in public areas with synchronised explosives in 2008: in Jaipur (May), Ahmedabad (July), Bangalore (July), and Delhi (September). These four assaults were carried out by young Indian Muslims who claimed allegiance to a group known as the Indian Mujahideen. They said they had nothing to do with the ISI of Pakistan or any of the terrorist groups operating out of the country. Many of those responsible for the blasts had attended non-religious universities. One of the three held a lucrative position in the Indian branch of a major American IT firm. There was widespread outrage directed at the government after the explosions because of its allegedly weak counter-terrorism policy, which was characterised by a reluctance to take action against Muslims who were implicated in terrorism because of what is known as "vote bank politics" in India. (Real Instituto Elcano, 2021) There are more than 160 million Muslims in India, and their votes matter in several States, especially in the country's northern regions. (Malik, 2019)

It has been claimed that the Indian government's failure to provide the police with the necessary authority and to establish a central body for a coordinated investigation of terrorist incidents was due to political calculations. Since no Pakistani national was involved and the ISI was not suspected to be involved, the explosions did not incite widespread public outrage against Pakistan.

In contrast, the 26/11 terrorist assault in Mumbai led to a wave of public outrage directed against the Indian government and Pakistan. The Indian people have been frustrated with the government because of its anti-terrorism efforts. Despite warnings from Indian and American intelligence in September 2008 that the LET intended to undertake a sea-borne terrorist attack on hotels on the Mumbai seashore, there was a catastrophic breakdown of physical and coastal security in the city of Mumbai. Reports indicated that the Taj Mahal Hotel was one of the potential targets of the terrorist attacks. People in India are frustrated with their government because they believe it has done nothing to stop the ISI from employing terrorism as a tool to further Pakistan's national interests. (Real Instituto Elcano, 2021)

Reaction from Pakistani and Indian Authorities



It has been widely reported and speculated on Indian TV that the terrorists were members of or connected to the Deccan Mujahadeen. One of the assailants later gave an interview to a TV station, where he claimed allegiance to an Indian Islamist group and pleaded for an end to the persecution of Indian Muslims. A British publication reported Ajmal Amir Kasab comes from a tiny town near Okara, Punjab, Pakistan. An Indian Navy official reported 24 terrorists entered Mumbai from Karachi on the merchant ship MV Alpha. The officer believes the crooks utilised rubber boats to reach the Gate of India. "The well-planned and well-orchestrated assaults, probably with foreign linkages, were aimed to provoke fear by picking high-profile targets," remarked Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on November 27, 2008. New Delhi would "aggressively" address attacks from neighbours, he said. The Indian government accuses Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT) for the Mumbai assault and has ordered Pakistan to cease terrorist activities that originate there.

In reaction to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, Pakistan's civilian government, which had taken power under President Asif Ali Zardari, issued a strong condemnation of the attacks and denied any complicity on its part. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf Gilani, has also spoken out in support of the victims and their families. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the foreign minister of Pakistan, was in New Delhi right before the terrorist attack. His coworkers heard him call what happened a "horrible catastrophe," and he shared their sadness. But in December 2008, India asked Pakistan to take serious action against the terrorists who were behind the Mumbai attack and to hand over three terrorists who were wanted by India. 1) Tiger Memon, 2) Dawood Ibrahim and 3) Maulana Masood Azhar all put a lot of pressure on Jamaat-ul-Dawa (JuD). (Ashraf, 2015) Pakistan later said that it would not send those people to another country. In January 2009, India presented proof of the Mumbai attacks and maintained its characterization of Pakistan as the world's preeminent hub for terrorist activity.

Pakistan assisted India in its search for the Mumbai attackers and backed India's efforts to broker peace in the region. Let me promise you that if any evidence points to a person or group in my part of the country, I will take the strongest action based on the facts and in front of the whole world," President Asif Ali Zardari stated in an interview. As stated (Thapar, 2008), Pakistan has remained steadfast in its claim that non-state individuals, unaffiliated with the current government or the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, were responsible for the Mumbai assault (ISI). Lashkar-e-Tayba was raided by Pakistani authorities on December 9, 2008, and the group was outlawed shortly after. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the group's top leader, and 11 other activists were also taken in. On December 10, 2008, Al-Akhtar Trust, Jamat-ul-Dawa (JuD), and Al-Rashid Trust were banned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. (Ashraf, 2015) In response to the UN Security Council resolution, the



Pakistani government began a nationwide crackdown on the JuD on December 12, 2008. The police made a number of swift arrests and shut down their operational offices with force. House arrest was issued for Hafiz Saeed. On January 7, 2009, however, Sherry Rehman, the minister of information in Pakistan, publicly acknowledged that Ajmal Amir Kasab was indeed a citizen of Pakistan. Parts of the assault had been organised in Pakistan, according to Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who made the admission later on February 12, 2009. In light of this admission, Pakistan claimed to have detained six people, including the "chief operator," in connection with the Mumbai attacks.

Relations since Mumbai Attacks

Since 2003, India and Pakistan have been working to mend their strained relationship through conversations centred on the peace process. India "failed to achieve any of its objectives after a human and financially costly year-long stand-off; the Indian business community strongly desired to have access to the Pakistani market; India's energy deficiency that stunted growth; and the threat of adverse effects on foreign investment when tens of thousands of foreigners, including 60,000 Americans, left India." (Zeb, 2009) Pakistan's position favoured a "peaceful resolution of Kashmir," while the United Nations, which was heavily involved in Afghanistan's War on Terror, also favoured a reconciliation process between nuclear states India and Pakistan. The US policy, according to Richard Lugar, was "intense, careful diplomacy by the US," which prevented a conflict between India and Pakistan. But in 2004, Pakistan had great hopes for the Indo-Pakistan peace process, and the subsequent meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani president in New York was a success, with peace on the agenda. The Foreign Secretaries of both governments met again in December 2004 with a more constructive agenda for peace talks. Suspicion of terrorist activities on the part of Pakistan made the peace process unstable at times. The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, may have mentioned "cross-border terrorism" in his address to the United Nations. In response, during his address to the General Assembly, President Musharraf reminded the Indians that they had failed to follow UN decisions over Kashmir. Nonetheless, the two governments have decided to press on with the peace process in spite of the many obstacles that remain. President Musharraf wanted a peaceful resolution that took into account the desires of the Kashmiris.

To further the peace process between India and Pakistan, India has expressed continued concern over cross-border terrorism and has requested a total dismantling of the terror structure. While Pakistan maintained its insistence that Kashmir is addressed first and foremost in any attempt at peace. When it comes to Kashmir, Siachin, and Sircreek, India has been stressing the conflict management approach whereas Pakistan has been



emphasising the conflict resolution process. (Ashraf, 2015) The Kabal Blast, which occurred in July 2008 at the Indian Embassy and killed 54 people and injured 141, was the turning point. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has publicly placed the responsibility for the horrific attack on Pakistan, citing evidence linking the ISI of that country to the bombing. In a speech at Harvard University in Boston on Monday, visiting Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee said, "Pakistan remains a nursery of global terrorism." Unfortunately, the rest of the world agreed with India and told Pakistan to stop spreading terrorism. After 9/11, Pakistan allegedly offered assistance to the US in the battle against terrorism along Afghanistan's western border. But it hasn't done anything to destroy the terrorist support network on its eastern border with India.

The violence in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, effectively ended Indo-Pak peace talks. India cancelled all secretary-level trade, Siachen, and Sir Creek negotiations. Cricket matches, a meeting of the Indian-Pakistani Joint Commission on the Environment, and the issue of visas to Pakistanis were all postponed as a result. (Malik, 2019) India has shown all of its cards in the fight against terrorism and emphasised its state of war readiness while focusing on swaying the world community against Pakistan's extremism. Pakistan's response was equal in seriousness; the country's military and political leaders made it plain they were prepared to deal with any fallout from the conflict. In spite of the fact that starting a war was almost certainly the goal of the Mumbai assault, western commentators are not convinced that tensions between India and Pakistan would escalate to that point. Pakistani troops were withdrawn from insurgent zones and redeployed to the country's borders with India. In spite of this, on December 16th, 2008, A. K. Antony, India's defence minister, announced that war will not be launched against Pakistan. He did, however, caution Pakistan that, if she wanted to have peaceful relations with India, she needed to take action against terrorism. The Western influence on "no conflict between India-Pakistan owing to their bigger interests in Afghanistan" and a rapid shift in Indian policy internally have both played a role. White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe said the U.S. has been in touch with both nations and is asking them to cooperate more fully in their investigation of the assaults in Mumbai last month, which India blames on extremists headquartered in Pakistan. (Raghavan, 2008)

The Indian military has opted for the 'Cold Start' policy out of concern that equal nuclear retaliation from Pakistan would hinder India's ability to achieve its goals. It's a strategy wherein several branches of the Indian military work together to launch coordinated offensives. The goal of India's Cold Start policy is to deter nuclear retribution from Pakistan by allowing the country's conventional forces to launch "holding assaults" in the event of a confrontation. It is likewise misguided to say that the army's new "Cold Start" doctrine improves our capacity to punish Pakistan. It has been shown that. (Raghavan,



2008) India, on the other hand, has chosen to employ multilateral diplomacy rather than the Cold Start strategy in its response to terrorism. The chosen policy is stated as follows: "of course, gives a chance for a sophisticated global effort to move Pakistan in the appropriate direction." This refers to governments that are experiencing political and economic turmoil. Specifically, (Raghavan, 2008)

Conclusion

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been unable to find a ground on which to settle their longstanding disagreements. The trial's historical evidence demonstrates the incoherence of their interactions and the unresolved concerns that prevented the two states from harmonising. The new age of terrorism that emerged in the twenty-first century has been largely responsible for the ongoing instability of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. The continuing peace process has been profoundly impacted by the string of terrorist attacks in India and the attacks by Indian extremists against Muslims. Extreme extremists' capacity, as seen by the 2008 Mumbai attack on high-profile Indians and foreigners, has weakened India's financial and political centre. Questions were also raised about the efficacy of the Indian security and intelligence apparatus, which failed to prevent casualties and safeguard the city's elite. The Mumbai bombings were a direct blow to efforts to improve relations between India and Pakistan. The episode marked the fatal conclusion and a turning point in the mutual mistrust between the two countries. It encouraged the spread of terrorism across the subcontinent and painted Pakistan in a negative international light. Since foreigners were the intended target of the attacks in Mumbai, they received unbounded support from across the world. Despite their own fascist groups' terrorism against Indian Muslims, many Indians have referred to the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai as the 9/11 of India and have called for unjustifiable pressure on Pakistan to end terrorism. However, we also can't ignore the role that non-state players in Pakistan played in the Mumbai terror attack. Although terrorism originated in the West, it has emerged as a constant danger to countries that are seen as powerful due to their proximity to Pakistan. The true problem stems from centuries of religious intolerance that date back to the early days of Islam in the subcontinent. The liberal equalising religion that was supposed to replace the caste system and was ruled by a small group of elite never caught on in the Indian subcontinent because of the widespread acceptance of the old Indian holy witness. Current terrorist activity still has a whiff of the Indo-Pakistani genetic concerns. Only by ending western interests and involvement and putting a stop to religious extremism among both regimes will true peace be achieved.



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