FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY AND CREDIBILITY OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Abstract

Nuclear South Asia continues to draw the attention of strategic studies scholars across the globe. With three nuclear-armed states rivalling each other in the region, the study of coercion, deterrence and compellence, escalation and crises has been given a fillip. The Indo-Pakistan dyadic relation is often compared and contrasted with the Cold War nuclear dyad, however, the strategic stability in the Cold War dyad only emerged when the U.S. and the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity by matching the number of their nuclear weapons, targeting options and the delivery means. In the South Asian case, the dilemma is that while strategic parity exists, there is asymmetry between Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces, numbers of nuclear weapons, targeting options, delivery vehicles and nuclear use doctrines. This asymmetry is a factor of crisis instability and deterrence instability which are essential components of the overall strategic stability. There is a need for Pakistan (and India) to strengthen the credibility of their nuclear deterrence by achieving first-strike stability to plug the vulnerabilities of crisis and deterrence instability. This requires a rethink of their nuclear use doctrines and for Pakistan, that incentive comes from India’s flirtation with its current ‘No First Use Doctrine’. This will enhance strategic stability in South Asia.